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PRAGMATISM AND POSTCOLONIALISM:  
PROTECTING NON-OWNERS IN  
PROPERTY LAW 
RASHMI DYAL-CHAND 
Property law has a particular problem with non-owners.  Although property 
law clearly identifies the rights of property “owners,” the rights of “non-owners” 
are vague.  This problem is significant because modern property law is often 
called upon to balance the rights and needs of owners and non-owners.  
Property law cannot adequately perform this function without clearly 
establishing both sets of rights.  The New Jersey Supreme Court case State v. 
Shack exemplifies this problem because it purports to be a case about protecting 
non-owners.  This Article examines both the case and the texts upon which the 
court relied to argue that the New Jersey Supreme Court could not adequately 
protect the non-owners in the case because the court could not understand their 
rights.  Instead, in its effort to evince a set of rights powerful enough to 
overcome the property owner’s rights, the court eliminated the voices of the 
migrant workers it claimed to protect. 
This Article draws upon postcolonialist theory both in examining the 
problem and in prescribing a solution.  In its prescription, the Article proposes 
a pragmatic form of postcolonialist inquiry as a theoretical foundation for 
protecting non-owners in property law.  Relying on the less iconic case of 
Hilder v. St. Peter, this Article proposes three devices within the common law 
                                                          
  Professor, Northeastern University School of Law.  I am grateful to Libby Adler, 
Muneer Ahmad, Gregory Alexander, Benjamin Ericson, Daniel Medwed, Mark 
Poirier, Joseph William Singer, and participants in the Progressive Property 
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Association of Law Schools (AALS) Midyear Meeting Workshop on Poverty, 
Immigration and Property.  Seth Purcell provided superb research assistance, and 
Elliott Hibbler of the Northeastern University Law Library provided indispensable 
research support. 
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tradition that are well suited to the task of representing and protecting non-
owners.  As Hilder demonstrates, legal decision-makers can more fully 
consider and protect the rights and needs of non-owners through the pragmatic 
use of storytelling, the personalization of claims, and the precise matching of 
remedies to harms and needs. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1971, the New Jersey Supreme Court enhanced its well-deserved 
reputation as a progressive and “activist” court1 with its holding in the 
                                                          
 1. For discussions of the New Jersey Supreme Court’s “activism” and 
“progressive” ideals, see, e.g., John B. Wefing, The New Jersey Supreme Court 1948–1998:  
Fifty Years of Independence and Activism, 29 RUTGERS L.J. 701, 701–06, 710 (1998) 
(reviewing examples that typify the court’s “activist tradition” and listing “factors 
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famous property case of State v. Shack.2  In that case, the court held 
that a legal services attorney and a field worker for a non-profit 
organization providing services to migrant workers were not guilty of 
criminal trespass.3  The defendants were charged with criminal 
trespass after they refused to leave the property of a landowner who 
employed and housed migrant workers on his large farm.4  In the 
course of creating a broad exception from the venerable property 
right to exclude, the court stated:  “Property rights serve human 
values.  They are recognized to that end, and are limited by it.”5  With 
this statement, the court reaffirmed its commitment to making 
important decisions on the basis of rights and needs in context, even 
if doing so meant abandoning the comfort and stability of 
precedent.6  In Shack, the rights at issue were the civil and political 
rights of non-owners of property, namely the migrant workers to whom 
the two defendants were attempting to provide legal and other 
important services.7  For many property scholars, the decision is a 
thrilling example of a legal decision-maker working hard to strike a 
balance between property and other rights upon recognizing the 
extraordinary distributive effects of exclusionary rights in property.8  
                                                          
[that] have led to the court’s reputation as a leading liberal, activist, and reformist 
court”); Kevin M. Mulcahy, Comment, Modeling the Garden:  How New Jersey Built the 
Most Progressive State Supreme Court and What California Can Learn, 40 SANTA CLARA L. 
REV. 863, 865–79 (2000) (explaining that the New Jersey Supreme Court has afforded 
criminal defendants “greater rights to those accused of crime than under the federal 
Constitution” and that it has been progressive in such areas as the right to refuse 
medical care, rape shield laws, and education reform). 
 2. 277 A.2d 369 (N.J. 1971). 
 3. Id. at 374–75. 
 4. Id. at 370. 
 5. Id. at 372.   
 6. See Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 
94 CORNELL L. REV. 745, 809 (2009) [hereinafter Alexander, The Social-Obligation 
Norm] (observing that the Shack court took the migrant workers’ precarious situation 
into account when deciding that their enjoyment of basic rights such as medical care 
were deeply connected to their employer’s property rights); Eric R. Claeys, Virtue and 
Rights in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 889, 940 (2009) (arguing that 
“Shack departs substantially from foundational principles of trespass”).   
 7. Shack, 277 A.2d at 371. 
 8. See, e.g., Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm, supra note 6, at 808–09 
(analyzing the role of health and affiliation rights in allowing a limited form of 
public access to private land); Curtis J. Berger, Pruneyard Revisited:  Political Activity 
on Private Lands, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 633, 663–67 (1991) (exploring the Shack 
“balancing analysis” as well as how common law courts might apply the Shack public-
forum doctrine to private lands); Eduardo M. Peñalver, Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. 
REV. 821, 883–84 (2009) (concluding that the court’s decision upheld the 
farmworkers’ rights to receive visitors on the farmer’s land without disregarding or 
unduly intruding on the farmer’s autonomy over his land); Joseph William Singer, 
The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611, 675–77 (1988) [hereinafter 
Singer, Reliance Interest] (surveying different situations in which members of the 
public have a right to access private property); Madhavi Sunder, IP3, 59 STAN. L. REV. 
257, 291–94, 296–97 (2006) (calling Shack “property law’s ‘social enlightenment’—
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Shack stands out in these respects.  It is justifiably a famous case in the 
property canon. 
But while Shack gives property lawyers much to admire, it also 
exemplifies a core problem in property law.  Behind the grandeur of 
the statement that property serves human values lies the question of 
whose values property serves, and moreover, of who determines what 
those values are.  In Shack, the court claimed that it was upholding 
the rights of a particular group of unprivileged individuals,9 and 
many legal scholars agree.10  But both as a technical matter, because 
no migrant workers were parties to the case,11 and more importantly 
as an analytical matter, the opinion of the New Jersey Supreme Court 
prevented those individuals from speaking.  The court’s inattention 
to the individual voices of the migrant workers in the case should 
lead readers to ask how much those workers really mattered to the 
decision.  In this respect, Shack also ought to be the subject of a 
powerful critique. 
The purpose of this Article is to mount that critique.  I argue that 
in the process of constructing a set of rights powerful enough to 
overcome the property owner’s right to exclude, the court effectively 
eliminated the voices of the migrant workers it claimed to protect.  As 
I discuss, this analytical approach is a quintessential example of the 
                                                          
the recognition that in a complex and increasingly interconnected society, property 
rights will inevitably conflict with other vital interests, from . . . health, to speech, to 
civil rights,” and analogizing the New Jersey Supreme Court’s balancing of property 
rights and other vital rights with the international social movement to limit 
intellectual property rights to guarantee access to affordable medicine); A.J. Van Der 
Walt, Property and Marginality, in PROPERTY AND COMMUNITY 81, 81 (Gregory S. 
Alexander & Eduardo M. Peñalver eds., 2010) (contending that the centrality society 
gives to property condemns certain individuals to the margins of society and of the 
law); Joan Williams, The Rhetoric of Property, 83 IOWA L. REV. 277, 343, 345–46 (1998) 
(suggesting that in referencing human dignity, the court was utilizing religious 
language to articulate its intuition about limits on property rights); cf. Helen 
Hershkoff, “Just Words”:  Common Law and the Enforcement of State Constitutional Social 
and Economic Rights, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1521, 1566, 1568 (2010) (arguing that, while 
some view Shack as “iconic,” the Shack court should have looked to the state 
constitution in promulgating the rule that it announced). 
 9. The following statements exemplify the court’s assumptions in this regard:  
“[A] decision in nonconstitutional terms is more satisfactory, because the interests of 
migrant workers are more expansively served in that way[.]”  Shack, 277 A.2d at 372.  
“Here we are concerned with a highly disadvantaged segment of our society.”  Id.  
“The quest is for a fair adjustment of the competing needs of the parties, in the light 
of the realities of the relationship between the migrant worker and the operator of 
the housing facility.”  Id. at 374.   
 10. See, e.g., Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm, supra note 6, at 809 (explaining 
that the court’s decision was an effective way to protect the “rootless,” “isolated,” and 
“fragile” migrants’ rights); Peñalver, supra note 8, at 883–84 (explaining that 
recognizing the migrants’ visitation rights “enhance[d] their ability to flourish”). 
 11. The case is a prosecution for violation of a criminal trespass statute.  Shack, 
277 A.2d at 370. 
DYAL-CHAND.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 11/7/2014  12:41 PM 
2014] PRAGMATISM AND POSTCOLONIALISM 1687 
dilemma identified by postcolonialist scholar Gayatri Chakravorty 
Spivak.12  In attempting to understand and indeed protect the 
postcolonial subject (or as Spivak says, the “subaltern”),13 the court 
“represented” the subject in a unified portrait that eliminated the 
fragmented space in which the subject could genuinely speak.14  In so 
doing, the court skillfully deployed an analytic that lies at the heart of 
precedential decision-making in Western law.  The court unified 
strands of factual information and policy analysis in such a way as to 
build a cohesive argument.  Indeed, the court’s skill was indispensible 
given its challenge of finding a legitimate means by which to curtail 
the venerable property right to exclude.15  But the court’s very 
proficiency in achieving this result was the mechanism by which it so 
completely eliminated the voices of the non-owners in the case.  
Simply put, their voices were not helpful to making the case.  This 
failure in postcolonial representation is associated with its own significant 
costs, which the literature on Shack has thus far failed to recognize. 
The lack of genuine representation in a progressive icon such as 
Shack highlights the expansiveness and depth of the problem of 
representation in property law.  In this sense, Shack is a particularly 
troubling example of a foundational problem in property law.  
Property law cannot claim to be about, for, or available to a broad 
range of subjects—immigrants, the poor, racial minorities, and other 
socially or economically marginalized communities—unless and until 
it can provide more robust and meaningful approaches to 
representing them.  It cannot evaluate and protect rights unless it 
obtains a more grounded sense of what those rights are.  And it is 
simply wrong, as this Article shows, to assume that the basic values 
addressed by property law are so universally shared as to be obvious 
to legal decision-makers without the need to listen to the voices of 
subaltern subjects. 
The imperative of genuine representation is thus a precondition 
for the application of economic and other analyses of the law.  
Progressive scholars have already explicated the dangers of monism 
in property law.16  It is only by recognizing that property rights are 
                                                          
 12. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Can the Subaltern Speak?, in MARXISM AND THE 
INTERPRETATION OF CULTURE 271, 271 (Cary Nelson & Lawrence Grossber eds., 1988) 
[hereinafter Spivak, Can the Subaltern Speak?] (defining the dilemma as involving “the 
discourses of the West and the possibility of speaking of (or for) the subaltern woman”). 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 277–78. 
 15. Shack, 277 A.2d at 374–75. 
 16. See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, Pluralism and Property, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1017, 1035–42 (2011) [hereinafter Alexander, Pluralism and Property] (discussing the 
value monist and value pluralist approaches of property theorists, and criticizing 
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rivalrous that we can understand the extent to which property rights 
have distributional consequences.17  But, as this Article argues, 
property law cannot stop there.  The inquiry must extend also to 
understanding what those pluralistic rights are in any given case.  
Property law must develop the capacity to accept, protect, and 
respond to the inevitable conflicts and fragmentation that will result 
from carefully listening to the voices of non-owners.  Without doing 
so, we cannot accurately define and apply such basic analytical 
devices as welfare maximization or distributional justice. 
But responding to subaltern voices in property law also requires 
adapting postcolonialist inquiries to the process of legal decision-
making and, in particular, to the process of precedential decision-
making as it is generally used within property law.  Decision-making 
in property law cases must change to permit better listening to 
subaltern voices, but postcolonialist critiques must also be altered to 
work within our system of lawmaking.  In recognition of this reality, 
this Article proposes a modified version of postcolonialist inquiry—
pragmatic postcolonialism—that actively investigates and creates 
space for subalternity and recognizes that, at the end of the dispute, 
courts must make rational decisions about the allocation of 
important resources.  Taking the much less famous property case of 
Hilder v. St. Peter18 as its example, this Article proposes three devices to 
achieve this critical balance.  All three have the beauty of tradition:  
they have long been important conventions in the common law.  But 
they also are well-suited to the task of exposing and protecting 
subaltern voices, often those of non-owners. 
Part I describes Shack’s contributions to property law as well as its 
limitations.  Part II lays out the theoretical frameworks both for 
critiquing the case and for more fully incorporating subaltern 
perspectives into property lawmaking.  The theoretical basis for the 
critique is postcolonialism as developed by Spivak.  The theoretical 
basis for the prescription is pragmatic postcolonialism, my own 
adaptation of the postcolonialist inquiry designed to operate 
effectively within our system of precedential decision-making.  In 
Parts III and IV, I apply both theoretical frameworks.  In Part III, I 
critique Shack as a problem of representation.  In doing so, I analyze 
                                                          
value monism for attempting to reduce all moral goods to a single standpoint that 
does not reflect reality). 
 17. Id. at 1035–36, 1042; see also Gregory Alexander et al., A Statement of Progressive 
Property, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 743, 744 (2009) [hereinafter Alexander et al., Progressive 
Property] (arguing that property law “should establish the framework for a kind of 
social life appropriate to a free and democratic society”). 
 18. 478 A.2d 202 (Vt. 1984). 
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the main writings relied upon by the New Jersey Supreme Court in 
constructing a unified and powerful image of the workers whom it 
sought to protect.  I also expose the costs associated with the court’s 
detachment from subaltern perspectives.  In Part IV, I develop the 
pragmatic postcolonialist mode of inquiry by examining Hilder v. St. 
Peter as a more successful treatment of the subaltern voice.  In 
particular, I use Hilder to develop three devices for exposing and 
protecting non-owners within property law.  These devices, all master 
achievements of the common law tradition, are the custom of 
storytelling, the personalization of claims, and the precise matching 
of remedies to harm and need.  I conclude by reconsidering Shack 
from a pragmatic postcolonialist perspective to demonstrate the 
radical effect of such a perspective on the way the case was decided. 
I. STATE V. SHACK AS PROGRESSIVE ICON 
A. A Rhetorical Tour de Force 
It is no small wonder that State v. Shack has achieved iconic status in 
property law, particularly among property scholars who identify (or 
are identified) as progressives.19  Even the most abbreviated 
description of the case communicates its rather extraordinary 
perspective on the traditional law of trespass.  Shack is a criminal case 
that arose after Tedesco (a landowner in New Jersey who employed 
migrant workers to work on his land) demanded that Shack (a legal 
services attorney) and Tejeras (a field worker for a poverty relief 
organization) leave his property.20  Shack and Tejeras had entered 
Tedesco’s land to find two migrant workers who they claimed 
required legal and medical services.21  As the two were making their 
way to the campsite where Tedesco provided housing for the migrant 
workers who worked on his farm, Tedesco confronted them, asked 
their intentions, and ultimately demanded that they leave his property.22 
As many a first-year law student has come to understand in the 
somewhat hapless search for precedent to support the court’s 
holding in Shack, the case is doctrinally noteworthy because it created 
such a broad exception to the traditional law of trespass when 
narrower grounds for decision were quite tenable.  The court 
                                                          
 19. See Ezra Rosser, The Ambition and Transformative Potential of Progressive Property, 
101 CALIF. L. REV. 107, 117–18 (2013) (discussing the interest in the case among 
several progressive property scholars). 
 20. Shack, 277 A.2d at 370–71. 
 21. Id. at 370. 
 22. Id. at 370–71. 
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rejected both an argument grounded in state landlord-tenant law 
(that tenants have the right to receive visitors)23 and federal 
constitutional arguments (involving the First Amendment freedom of 
association and the supremacy of certain federal statutes protecting 
migrant farm workers)24 in favor of a broadly worded limitation on 
the right to exclude founded on “a maxim of the common law.”25  
Even without resort to constitutional claims or landlord-tenant law, 
narrower exceptions to trespass law were available.  The court could 
reasonably have concluded that the medical needs of one of the 
migrant workers whom the defendants were trying to find 
necessitated the defendants’ intrusion.  The court laid a foundation 
for this conclusion26 but did not rely on it in its holding.27  
Alternatively, the court could have held that, by choosing to house 
workers on his property, Tedesco implicitly consented to entry by his 
workers’ visitors as well.28 
Instead, the court used the general doctrine that “one should so 
use his property as not to injure the rights of others”29 as an 
instrumental, doctrinal constraint on the right to exclude.  Using its 
equitable powers30 in a very full sense of that term and with a view 
towards standard setting,31 the court held in its broadest statements: 
[T]he employer may not deny the worker his privacy or interfere 
with his opportunity to live with dignity and to enjoy associations 
customary among our citizens.  These rights are too fundamental 
to be denied on the basis of an interest in real property and too 
fragile to be left to the unequal bargaining strength of the parties.32 
                                                          
 23. Id. at 374. 
 24. Id. at 371. 
 25. Id. at 373. 
 26. See id. (stating, “it has long been true that necessity, private or public, may 
justify entry upon the lands of another”). 
 27. See id. at 374 (holding that there was “no legitimate need for a right in the 
farmer to deny the worker the opportunity for aid available from federal, State, or 
local services, or from recognized charitable groups seeking to assist him”). 
 28. Indeed, Professor Singer has argued that the broad public policy exception 
to trespass on which the court relied in the case was grounded on the principle of 
consent:  “The court held that once the farmowner had opened his property to 
migrant farmworkers, he effectively waived part of his right to exclude non-owners 
from his property.  The court therefore created a public policy exception to the right 
to exclude under trespass doctrine.”  Singer, Reliance Interest, supra note 8, at 675–76. 
 29. Shack, 277 A.2d at 373. 
 30. See Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 578 
(1988) (examining how courts have blurred and complicated property rules that 
were previously clear and distinct). 
 31. See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. 
L. REV. 1685, 1695–96 (1976) (discussing the merits of standards versus rules and 
commenting that strictly applied rules may be over or under inclusive while 
standards may risk arbitrary or uncertain results). 
 32. Shack, 277 A.2d at 374–75. 
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It was, as the court said, “unthinkable that the farmer-employer can 
assert a right to isolate the migrant worker in any respect significant 
for the worker’s well-being.”33 
But Shack’s greater influence has been on property norms rather 
than on property doctrine.34  In generalized form, Shack is a doctrinal 
symbol that the right to exclude in property law is anything but 
absolute.  To the extent that the law of trespass is the purest 
manifestation of the right to exclude, Shack demonstrates that there 
are numerous and critical limitations on that right and, moreover, 
that some of these can be so broad as to reflect and preserve the 
“human values” of “health, welfare, [and] dignity.”35  In essence, 
Shack exemplifies what Professor Singer has described as the “public 
interest” exception to trespass.36  Shack thus epitomizes that strain of 
American property law that resists the Blackstonian view of property 
as exclusionary.  In this view, which has seen a tremendous 
groundswell of active scholarship in the last five years, property law’s 
critical function(s) cannot be reduced to the erection of boundaries 
that protect the private space required for individuals to act in 
pursuit of individualized gains.37 
Instead, according to this view, the essential function of property 
law is to provide a framework for the pursuit of relationships and 
interconnection.38  Viewed in this light, Shack’s value is in 
highlighting several sets of relationships.  The most obvious, perhaps, 
is the connection between the migrant workers and those who sought 
to provide them with services that the court, Congress, and others 
                                                          
 33. Id. at 374. 
 34. Rosser, supra note 19, at 154 (noting the limited doctrinal impact of the 
case); see Claeys, supra note 6, at 939–40 (suggesting that the legal issue in Shack was 
narrower than other legal scholars suggest); Henry E. Smith, Mind the Gap:  The 
Indirect Relation Between Ends and Means in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 
959, 984 (2009) (arguing that the generalized balancing test the Shack court claimed 
it was establishing was more of a rhetorical strategy than one applied literally). 
 35. Shack, 277 A.2d at 372. 
 36. Singer, Reliance Interest, supra note 8, at 675–76 (noting that the legal system 
has a variety of rules allowing members of the public access to private property based 
on need or “on some other important public policy”). 
 37. Professor Singer has used Sir. Edward Coke’s castle powerful tendency in 
property law.  Joseph William Singer, The Ownership Society and Takings of Property:  
Castles, Investments, and Just Obligations, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 309 (2006) 
[hereinafter Singer, Ownership Society] (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 38. See JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT:  THE PARADOXES OF PROPERTY 203–
04 (2000) [hereinafter SINGER, ENTITLEMENT] (suggesting that “[p]roperty is a 
paradox” because in order to protect the rights of others, a limit must be imposed on 
property rights); Nestor M. Davidson & Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Property in Crisis, 78 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1607, 1638–39 (2010) (highlighting the “interconnected nature of 
property”); Joseph L. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149, 
152 (1971) (arguing that the use of one’s own parcel of property is simultaneously 
the use of property beyond the user’s border).  
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deemed necessary to improve their lives.39  The court’s concern over 
this connection was in promoting the migrant workers’ greater 
integration with the surrounding community so that they could take 
advantage of the opportunities that existed there.40  A second set of 
relations that seemed important to the court, but about which it 
made only general statements, were the interactions among the 
workers themselves.41  Finally, there was the interdependence of 
Tedesco and the migrant workers in a web of economic activity.  Each 
required the other, with Tedesco providing the land and financing to 
work the land and the workers providing the labor on the land to 
yield marketable products at a competitive price.42  For each, the 
value of the land was greater as a result of the contributions of the 
other.  The court acknowledged this relationship in its resistance to 
the idea that the relationship was one solely of “dominion” by the 
owner over the non-owners.43  Ultimately, although the court failed to 
capture these relationships in a doctrine of lasting precedential value, 
it succeeded in powerfully articulating the normative import of 
some of the interconnections (and more broadly, the context) 
underlying the case.44 
Shack also serves as a high point in property jurisprudence for 
scholars who argue that property law imposes social obligations on 
landowners vis-à-vis non-landowners.  In developing the idea that the 
duties of ownership play an important role in property law, Professor 
Alexander has used Shack to demonstrate the quite specific ways in 
which the court defined the owner’s duty to promote the 
“flourishing” of property non-owners: 
The property right to receive visitors to the farms where they work 
and live was virtually the only effective means of providing them 
with access to such basic necessities as medical care, which are 
constitutive of the capability of life. 
 Affiliation will also enter into the analysis.  In the context of 
Shack, affiliation takes on a more fundamental meaning, literally 
grounding the capability of life . . . .  Affiliation is, moreover, the 
foundation for creating just social relations in the migrant farm 
                                                          
 39. Shack, 277 A.2d at 372 (discussing federal and state statutes enacted to 
provide support and services to migrant workers). 
 40. Id. at 372–73. 
 41. Id. at 372 (explaining that migrant workers are a distinct community that is 
isolated from the local community). 
 42. Id. at 370. 
 43. Id. at 372. 
 44. Rosser, supra note 19 at 154–55. 
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community by providing the workers with equality and dignity 
otherwise denied them by their employer’s treatment.45 
According to Alexander, the social-obligation norm in property law 
requires owners to create physical space for non-owners to engage in 
the “socializing activity” of affiliation.46  He demonstrated this point 
using both Shack and a number of public trust doctrine cases.  
Interestingly, in describing modern public trust doctrine cases, 
Alexander was able to identify the activities associated with affiliation 
(baseball games and beachcombing) with specificity,47 while in 
describing the need of affiliation in Shack, he was more basic and 
abstract in his assumptions about the role affiliation plays in that 
particular community of migrant workers.48 
Writing from a postcolonial perspective, Professor Sunder has used 
Shack to make much the same point.  Sunder has argued that Shack 
represented a unique moment when property law recognized the 
distributional impact of property rights on non-owners.49  It was, as 
she described it, a moment of “social enlightenment” in property 
law.50  Both Sunder and Alexander applauded the court’s use of social 
context to recognize, as a legal matter, that the migrant workers on 
Tedesco’s farm did not have access to the same things as members of 
the surrounding community.51  For them, Shack was a uniquely 
powerful reminder of the effect of property ownership on “Others.”52 
B. A Case about Self-Restraint, but Not Self-Expression 
The particular combination of doctrine and norms in Shack 
achieved a quite specific result in property law, although the 
specificity of Shack’s impact has receded into the shadows as it has 
                                                          
 45. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm, supra note 6, at 809. 
 46. Id.  
 47. Id. at 809–10. 
 48. Id. at 809. 
 49. Sunder, supra note 8, at 291–93, 297 (highlighting that Shack’s balancing of 
property interests vis-à-vis other fundamental values can be seen in the World Trade 
Organization’s efforts to balance intellectual property rights with access to affordable 
life-saving medical treatments).   
 50. Id. at 291 (describing Shack as an example of “social enlightenment” because 
the court recognized that, in an increasingly interconnected society, property rights 
will be at odds with other vital interests). 
 51. Id.; see also Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm, supra note 6, at 809 (noting 
that migrant workers were “unaware of the opportunities that exist[ed] for them”). 
 52. Spivak coined this term, too.  See BILL ASHCROFT ET AL., POSTCOLONIAL 
STUDIES:  THE KEY CONCEPTS 188 (3d. ed. 2013) (explaining that “othering,” as coined 
by Spivak, refers to the process through which imperial discourse creates its 
colonized subjects). 
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become more famous and symbolic.53  It is worth pausing, therefore, 
to consider what exactly Shack achieved and what it did not achieve. 
Despite the astute observations by progressive scholars about values 
and norms that Shack protected on behalf of non-owners, it is 
important to note that the case did not really focus on the non-
owners.  To the extent Shack can be said to protect the rights of non-
owners, those rights can be defined only broadly or, if the rights are 
defined more narrowly, only speculatively.  For example, Professor 
Sunder observed that Shack is extraordinary because it recognizes the 
workers’ poverty as a force that conflicted with the rights of property 
owners, ultimately requiring such rights to give way to the conflicting 
rights of those in poverty.54  It is difficult, though, to put a finger on a 
more precise vision of what poverty really meant for the class of 
people who were poor in Shack.  They were described as “rootless,” 
“isolated,” “highly disadvantaged,” and “without economic or political 
power.”55  But these descriptions do not tell us what the workers felt, 
experienced, or understood about their impoverished situation. 
Similarly, Professor Alexander picked out the value of affiliation to 
the non-owners in Shack.  The affiliation right is a version of the 
doctrinal claims in later cases that Shack was a case about privacy and 
assembly, core civil rights protected by the First Amendment.56  But 
again, there was no analysis or evidence in the case about the relative 
importance, meaning, value, or indeed relevance of these rights to 
the migrant workers who worked on Tedesco’s farm.  It could be 
argued that these rights were props, or class-based claims that we 
(and, as Part III discusses, the court57) could assume people in such a 
position would hold up as important.  But there is no evidence that 
those workers did in fact hold them up as important or why they 
might have done so. 
                                                          
 53. See Rosser, supra note 19, at 154–55 (cautioning that Shack alone cannot 
transform property law as it exemplifies the challenge of converting formal rules into 
meaningful, substantive rights). 
 54. Sunder, supra note 8, at 291–92. 
 55. State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 372 (N.J. 1971). 
 56. See, e.g., State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615, 615, 629 (N.J. 1980) (reasoning that 
even though a private university was not subject to First Amendment obligations, it 
could nevertheless be required to honor First Amendment rights if its property was 
sufficiently devoted to public uses); Freedman v. N.J. State Police, 343 A.2d 148, 150–
51 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1975) (suggesting that furnishing property for dwellings 
is an activity that is regulated by public interest considerations under the First 
Amendment); see also N.J. Coal. Against War in the Middle E. v. J.M.B. Realty Corp., 
650 A.2d 757, 760 (N.J. 1994) (holding that based on citizens’ free speech rights 
“embodied in [the New Jersey] Constitution,” regional and community shopping 
centers had to allow leafleting on societal issues). 
 57. See infra Part III.A.1 (explaining that the court’s perception of workers was 
influenced by the Federal Economic Opportunity Act). 
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The workers were not parties to the case.58  Their rights and needs 
were voiced by the defendants, who claimed to represent them for 
quite narrow purposes.59  Neither the particular stories of the two 
workers with whom the defendants sought to meet, nor the stories of 
those with whom those workers worked, appeared to be relevant to 
the New Jersey Supreme Court.  We do not know what they would 
have said.  It is thus not appropriate to understand Shack as a case 
that defined the rights, needs, and voices of the particular “Others” 
who were the subjects (though here, it is well to acknowledge that 
they were rather more the objects) of the case. 
Instead, the real focus of Shack was on the rights of Tedesco and 
other property owners.  The point of Shack was really to re-cast the 
image of property ownership as requiring entitled owners to fulfill 
certain duties.  These duties might variously include the duties to 
share and exercise self-restraint,60 to act as a good host,61 or to 
balance one’s personal and property needs and rights against the 
personal and property rights of others.62  Regardless of how these 
duties are described, they ultimately limit an owner’s ability to build 
insurmountable walls around herself. 
Correlatively, then, Shack was about the limits of property rights 
rather than about their expansive potential.  It was a case that took 
very seriously the notion that rights of ownership are not boundless.63  
It was not, however, a case that defined which rights exactly ought 
always or sometimes to take priority over the right to build walls and 
                                                          
 58. Shack, 277 A.2d at 370. 
 59. Id. 
 60. See Peñalver, supra note 8, at 880–84 (arguing that because the system of 
private property is meant to allow members of the community to “flourish,” property 
owners have an obligation to share their surplus property to satisfy others’ 
fundamental needs). 
 61. See Singer, Reliance Interest, supra note 8, at 674–77 (discussing the “public 
trust doctrine,” which “preserves public rights of access to private property that the 
public needs at the present time,” as well as other doctrines that compel landowners to 
host members of the public and only to exclude them from private property for 
“good reason . . . on a case by case basis”).  See generally Joseph William Singer, No 
Right to Exclude:  Public Accommodations and Private Property, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1283, 
1321 (1996) [hereinafter Singer, No Right to Exclude] (arguing that there is no good 
justification for limiting the common law duty to serve the public just to innkeepers 
and common carriers).  
 62. See Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm, supra note 6, at 809 (highlighting 
that the only way the migrant workers could have access to basic necessities, such as 
medical care, was by allowing them to receive visitors on the farm); Peñalver, supra 
note 8, at 880 (arguing that because the private property system is designed to 
facilitate the flourishing of the members of a community, property owners’ rights are 
limited by an obligation to share surplus property with those in need). 
 63. Shack, 277 A.2d at 373 (“A man’s right in his real property of course is 
not absolute.”). 
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exclude.64  Being true to the spirit of Shack would require us to 
acknowledge that the case was not really about affiliation or any other 
particular personal or property right of the migrant workers.  Rather, 
it was about limiting the venerable right to exclude. 
This description of the limitations of State v. Shack is by no means 
intended to belittle declarations of self-restraint.  Shack was an 
exemplary moment of self-reflection, a commentary on what each of 
us can do to define and personify our duties through property 
ownership.  It was an extraordinary example of acknowledging the 
effects of power through property on those who are property-less and 
thus, in important respects, powerless.  Shack opened an inquiry that 
scholars such as Professors Alexander and Singer have undertaken 
into the pragmatic potential of self-restraint in property ownership.65  
From a Legal Realist perspective, viewing the judges on the New 
Jersey Supreme Court as individuals with a certain status in society,66 
it would be difficult to imagine a more honest adjudication on the 
basis of personal position and experience.  The adjudicators were 
true to themselves. 
II. POSTCOLONIALISM IN CRITICAL AND PRAGMATIC FORMS 
The problem with State v. Shack, then, lies not in what the case said 
about property ownership, but in what it said about the particular 
property non-owners in the case.  The purpose of this Part is to 
present two theoretical frameworks—one for exploring that problem 
and a second for fixing it.  Section A presents postcolonialist theory 
as the basis for critiquing the problem.  This Section focuses on 
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s analysis of the problem of representing 
subaltern voices.  Section B describes why Spivak’s inquiry is so 
difficult to incorporate into common law decision-making and, in 
particular, into property lawmaking.  In short, Spivak’s understanding 
of representation is intensely deconstructionist, thereby threatening 
to paralyze the very process of rational legal decision-making.  
Section C presents a second theoretical framework that adapts 
                                                          
 64. Rosser, supra note 19, at 154 (cautioning that Shack has had limited 
doctrinal impact).  
 65. See SINGER, ENTITLEMENT, supra note 38, at 17 (discussing the role of trust in 
property ownership as well as the interplay of liberty interests and property 
obligations that come with ownership); Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm, supra 
note 6, at 809–10 (arguing that an owner’s obligation to contribute to the flourishing 
of others requires that the owner supports rights of affiliation); Singer, Reliance 
Interest, supra note 8, at 675–76 (highlighting that the right of access in Shack rested 
on the farmworkers’ needs and vulnerability). 
 66. Roscoe Pound, The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence, 44 HARV. L. REV. 697, 710–11 
(1931) (proposing seven characteristics of realist jurisprudence). 
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Spivak’s inquiry for use in legal decision-making.  In doing so, it 
proposes a new theoretical construct:  pragmatic postcolonialism. 
A. Critical Postcolonialism 
My critique of State v. Shack is that it provided no opportunity for 
the migrant workers described in that case to “speak” through the 
case.  This is a problem identified by postcolonialist scholars.67  It is a 
concern with representation and voice and a recognition that certain 
individuals and classes of individuals who have been the objects of 
colonization and its postmodern effects have very little space in 
which to speak. 
Professor Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak may well be the best narrator 
of the problem of representation that I claim inheres in State v. Shack.  
In 1985, Spivak published one of the defining essays of the 
postcolonialist movement, “Can the Subaltern Speak?”68  Spivak’s 
central inquiry in the essay concerned the problem of 
“represent[ing]”69 the subaltern “masses”70 who have experienced the 
effects of colonialism.71  For Spivak, the problem of representation 
occurs largely because of the pressure Western intellectuals feel to 
understand the postcolonial subject.  They respond to this pressure 
by “conflat[ing]” two different understandings of the verb “to 
represent.”72  These understandings are captured by Karl Marx’s use 
of the German verbs vertreten and darstellen in The Eighteenth Brumaire 
of Louis Bonaparte.73  Spivak interpreted vertreten to mean political 
representation and darstellen to mean aesthetic representation74 and 
described the former as “proxy” and the latter as “portrait.”75  Spivak 
insisted that it is critical to the postcolonial subject and, in particular, 
to the problem of giving the postcolonial subject her voice, to 
acknowledge that these two forms of representation expose a 
fragmented voice.76  Indeed, Spivak argued, it is the possibility of 
                                                          
 67. See, e.g., ASHCROFT ET AL., supra note 52, at 244–47 (defining “subaltern” as “of 
inferior rank,” explaining how the term has been used in postcolonial South Asian 
studies, and explaining that, in India, the bourgeoisie “failed to speak” for the 
subaltern groups and thus for the nation as a whole). 
 68. Spivak, Can the Subaltern Speak?, supra note 12. 
 69. Id. at 275 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 70. Id. at 274 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 71. Id. at 283. 
 72. Id. at 274. 
 73. Id. at 276–78. 
 74. Id. at 278. 
 75. Id. at 276. 
 76. Id. at 275, 279; see also JANET HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS:  HOW AND WHY TO 
TAKE A BREAK FROM FEMINISM 94–95 (2006) (describing Spivak’s analysis of 
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remaining cognizant of and “expos[ing]” the different 
representations (vertreten and darstellen) of the subaltern that gives the 
subaltern subject the most space to speak.77  By contrast, the Western 
intellectual is driven to attempt to unify these distinct forms of 
representation to create a voice that is more intelligible to the 
Western intellectual but also (let us acknowledge) a voice that has 
more pragmatic thrust in the progressive Western intellectual’s quest 
to defend the rights of the subaltern.78 
Why was the preservation of fragmented voice so terribly important 
for Spivak?  The answer lies partly in the relationship between the 
subaltern subject and those who have the capacity to represent her in 
the political (or legal) sense of that word.79  Such representation is 
riven with conflicted meanings, aspirations, and motivations.  
Specifically, Spivak took from Marx the point that the class of people 
represented is only a class to the degree that they live under a 
distinctive set of economic conditions.80  They are not, however, a 
class in the sense that they share a feeling of community as a result of 
that condition.81  This fragmentation and, in particular, the lack of 
representative consciousness of class condition, appears to require 
that the subaltern subjects be represented by someone other than 
themselves.82  But this particular form of representation creates the 
problem that the class is represented by an authority that both 
protects and controls it.  The consequence, as Spivak argued, is 
darstellen, portraiture, in addition to vertreten, proxy, by someone 
other than the subject as well as a narrowing of such representation to 
that which is perceived and imposed by that someone.83 
Lest readers are tempted to think that this problem of 
representation only exists at relatively more advanced levels of 
existence—,in other words that there are certain basic conditions that 
are unambiguous in how they could be represented—Spivak 
provided brutally defiant examples.  The first was the example of sati, 
                                                          
divergent views of Indian women, namely as a postcolonial subject or as an Indian 
nativist representation). 
 77. Spivak, Can the Subaltern Speak?, supra note 12, at 277 (discussing different 
formations of community in creating class consciousness). 
 78. Id. at 276, 279–80. 
 79. Id. at 276–77. 
 80. Id. at 277 (adding that “[i]n so far as . . . the identity of their interests fails 
to produce a feeling of community . . . they do not form a class” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 276–77. 
 83. Id. at 277–78. 
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or widow, sacrifice in India,84 and the second was a particular case of 
suicide by a woman in Calcutta in 1926.85  In each of these examples, 
Spivak traced multiple interpretations—appearing in multiple texts—
about what motivated the women who died.  In the case of sati, for 
example, was it the women’s choice to free themselves of their bodies 
and join their husbands in eternal celestial pleasure, as claimed by 
Hindu religious texts?86  Or was it the pressure from their dead 
husbands’ relatives in whose way the widows stood in inheriting the 
property as “P.V. Kane, the great historian of the Dharmasāstra” 
suggested?87  The answer to this question of course drives the legal 
response.88  Time and again in these examples, Spivak showed the 
unremitting challenge in finding the voice of the women who died.  
Even with respect to the basic capability of life, Spivak argued, it is a 
terrible mistake to assume complicity between vertreten and darstellen.  
This may explain why Amartya Sen, the originator of the 
measurement of human flourishing as a means of defining the 
condition of poverty, has resolutely refused to adopt a specific and 
universal list of capabilities.89  Sen argues instead that such a list must 
be left to be divined by local and democratic processes attuned to 
particular places and times.90 
Two additional features deserve attention in this description of 
Spivak’s postcolonialist perspective on representation.  The first is 
that it differs from—indeed, it disputes—the Foucaultian ideal that 
individual narrative is crucial.91  It could be argued that “rebellious” 
lawyers absorbed Foucault’s message and applied it in raising a variety 
of legal claims on behalf of marginalized clients, even if the lesson 
                                                          
 84. Id. at 297–98 (noting the British abolished the practice but acknowledging 
that its abolition “has been generally understood as a case of ‘White men . . . saving 
brown women from brown men’”). 
 85. Id. at 307–08 (describing the young teenaged woman as having committed 
suicide when she could not “confront the task” of assassinating a political figure 
during struggles for Indian independence). 
 86. Id. at 303. 
 87. Id. at 300. 
 88. Indeed, the legal response, namely the colonial British law outlawing sati, is 
Spivak’s beginning point in her critical analysis.  Id. at 298. 
 89. Amartya Sen, Conceptualizing and Measuring Poverty, in POVERTY AND 
INEQUALITY 34–35 (David B. Grusky & Ravi Kanbur eds., 2006) (resisting the impulse 
to develop a specific list of capabilities); see also Martha Nussbaum, Human Rights and 
Human Capabilities, 20 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 21, 21 (2007) (discussing this resistance on 
Sen’s part). 
 90. Sen, supra note 89, at 30, 37 (giving the example that “a person in New York 
may well suffer from poverty despite having a level of income that would make him 
or her immune from poverty in Bangladesh or Ethiopia”).   
 91. STEVEN BEST & DOUGLAS KELLNER, THE POSTMODERN TURN 275–76 (1997) 
(discussing Foucault’s influence on the development of a “micropolitics” of 
individualized struggle and personal narrative). 
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was less apparent in property law.92  Examples of such practices 
include the protection and indeed exaltation of client “storytelling” 
as part of the process of legal representation.93  Spivak argued, however, 
that it is nothing less than an abdication of responsibility for the Western 
intellectual to assume that the subaltern can speak for herself.94 
The second feature is that Spivak’s view of representation defies 
the Hegelian notion of “property as personhood”95 and thus 
challenges the possibility that progressive property law could respond 
to the postcolonialist problem of representation by recognizing 
classes of property that are more “personal”96 or that might be 
managed using more personalized principles such as “stewardship.”97  
Part of the problem with the Hegelian prescription, at least as it is 
currently deployed, is that from a pragmatic perspective, it requires a 
relatively cohesive sense of what is “personal” to a given class,98 a 
cohesion at the core of Spivak’s opposition.  Moreover, the idea of 
using property as a device for constituting oneself assumes a level of 
vertreten, of community identification with a class-based set of 
interests, that Spivak may argue often does not exist. 
While Spivak’s claims about voice and representation may seem 
quite compelling when built upon examples from colonial and 
postcolonial India, it is reasonable to ask how, why, and to what 
                                                          
 92. See GERALD P. LÓPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING:  ONE CHICANO’S VISION OF 
PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE 33 (1992) (discussing the work of rebellious lawyering, 
such as broader community engagement, through the narrative of a legal aid attorney). 
 93. See Binny Miller, Give Them Back Their Lives:  Recognizing Client Narrative in Case 
Theory, 93 MICH. L. REV. 485, 485–86 (1994) (suggesting that, although “lawyers have 
always seen their work as in part ‘storytelling,’ . . . only recently has legal scholarship 
framed lawyering in these terms” (footnote omitted)); see also Louise G. Trubek, 
Lawyering for Poor People:  Revisionist Scholarship and Practice, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 983, 
987 (1994) (articulating the evolving focus on attorney and client interactions in 
legal practice); Lucie E. White, Seeking “. . . the Faces of Otherness . . .”:  A Response to 
Professors Sarat, Felstiner, and Cahn, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1499, 1509–11 (1992) 
(recounting an encounter with a client, a “seventy-two year old former sharecropper 
in rural North Carolina,” through a Foucaultian lens and also noting that “this lens 
reveals only a partial reality”). 
 94. Spivak, Can the Subaltern Speak?, supra note 12, at 274–76. 
 95. See Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 971–72 
(1982) (explaining that under Hegel’s theory, “[p]ersonal property is important 
precisely because its holder could not be the particular person that she is without it”). 
 96. Id. at 960. 
 97. Kristen A. Carpenter et al., In Defense of Property, 118 YALE L.J. 1022, 1028–29 
(2009) (arguing that “cultural property claims are often better explained and 
justified through a stewardship model that effectuates the dynamic pluralism of 
group-oriented interests”). 
 98. See Radin, supra note 95, at 961 (“But if property for personhood cannot be 
viewed as other than arbitrary and subjective, then personal objects merely represent 
strong preferences, and to argue for their recognition by the legal system might 
collapse to a simple utilitarian preference summing.  To avoid this collapse requires 
objective criteria differentiating good from bad identification with objects in order to 
identify a realm of personal property deserving recognition.”). 
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extent such a critique is applicable to American property law.  
Specifically, who is “subaltern” in modern property disputes?  Spivak’s 
own definition of subaltern centers on the concept of social and 
cultural access, coalescing around the concept that subaltern 
individuals are those who so lack “social mobility” as to be incapable 
of “a recognisable basis of action.”99  In her 1985 essay, Spivak also 
quotes the definition propounded by the leading representative of 
the term as used by the “Subaltern Studies” group.100  Like Spivak, 
this group uses subaltern to define those who are left out of the “elite 
achievements” in their society that amount to participation.101  These 
may include the development of nationalist movements with the 
strength to overcome colonial rule.102 
Using these definitions, the migrant workers in Shack seem 
subaltern.  Arguably, their only digression from the definition is that 
they were not situated in the Indian subcontinent.  As the legislative 
history for the Economic Opportunity Act depicts, the migrant 
workers lacked social mobility in American society.103  But it is 
reasonable to assume that many were also at the economic margins of 
their home countries.  Using migrant workers from Mexico as an 
example, partly as a result of Mexico’s colonial past, economic 
opportunity was stratified in such a way as to force those outside of 
the social and cultural lines of power and access to leave their homes 
in order to earn enough income to provide for their families.104  
These individuals were essentially a product of an implicit economic 
agreement that required their marginalization and cheap labor.105  
                                                          
 99. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Scattered Speculations on the Subaltern and the 
Popular, 8 POSTCOLONIAL STUD. 475, 475–76 (2005). 
 100. Spivak, Can the Subaltern Speak?, supra note 12, at 283–84 (defining this group 
as comprising “a collective of intellectuals that must ask, [c]an the subaltern speak?”).   
 101. Id. at 283.  In significant respects, Spivak disputes the Subaltern Studies 
group’s understanding of subalternity, but there is this basic and important overlap, 
grounded in a cultural and social exclusion, and resulting lack of options. 
 102. Id. 
 103. See infra Part III.A.1 (summarizing the legislative history of the Economic 
Opportunity Act). 
 104. See Gerald P. López, Undocumented Mexican Migration:  In Search of a Just 
Immigration Law and Policy, 28 UCLA L. REV. 615, 620 (1981) (citing “socioeconomic 
imbalances between regions” as a cause of mass migrations); see also Margaret F. 
Brinig & F. H. Buckley, The Market For Deadbeats, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 201, 202–03 (1996) 
(explaining different policies that favor or discourage certain types of migrants); 
Mae M. Ngai, The Civil Rights Origins of Illegal Immigration, 78 INT’L LAB. & WORKING-
CLASS HIST. 93, 98 (2010) (arguing that, in the 1920s, the United States-Mexico 
border was open and easy to cross for those without documentation so as to 
encourage the growth of a disposable labor force from Mexico). 
 105. See MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS:  ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF 
MODERN AMERICA 95 (2004) (“The agricultural labor market and [U.S.] immigration 
laws worked in tandem to create a kind of imported colonialism.”); Gilbert Paul 
Carrasco, Latinos in the United States:  Invitation and Exile, in IMMIGRANTS OUT!  THE 
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While it is dangerous to make too many assumptions from their 
demographics, the facts suggest a desire, but also an inability, to 
remain connected to the economic, social, and cultural communities 
in those countries.106  As one of the few quotations from migrant 
workers in the legislative history expressed, “We go everywhere and 
we don’t belong nowhere.”107 
While the meaning of subaltern has changed and become more 
nuanced in the decades since Spivak first published her essay—and 
even in the near-decade since she defined subaltern as a lack of social 
mobility—the meaning retains several features that distinguish it 
from the broader category of subordinate individuals.  Two features 
among the many in this evolution are useful for my purposes here.  
First, while acknowledging that “colonialism [is] a diverse, changing 
bundle of historical forces rather than . . . a comprehensive 
structure,”108 the term “subaltern” is still grounded in a colonialist 
social and cultural history.  Second, as Spivak has repeatedly 
emphasized, subalternity is fundamentally about heterogeneity, both 
as compared against individuals who are not subaltern and within the 
category itself.109  Subaltern individuals are not a unitary class in most 
of the respects that matter.  As I will discuss in Section II.C., this 
Article adopts these two features of the more modern definition of 
subalternity.  But while subalternity is important to my theoretical 
framework, I also am using subaltern inquiries as a means of 
developing tools to respond to the broader issue of property law’s 
response to subordination.  In particular, the frameworks I deploy in 
                                                          
NEW NATIVISM AND THE ANTI-IMMIGRANT IMPULSE IN THE UNITED STATES 190, 190 (Juan 
F. Perea ed., 1997) (characterizing migrant employment by “harsh working 
conditions, enormous amounts of physical labor, and minimal remuneration”); 
Lopez, supra note 104, at 683–84 (expounding on the marginal economic status of 
the landless rural working class, a situation that remains in modern migration trends).  
 106. See S. REP. NO. 91-83, at 4–5 (1969) (explaining trends in the migrant laborer 
population, namely that the majority were under twenty-five and male, often with 
active ties to their home countries). 
 107. Id. at 18. 
 108. David Ludden, Introduction:  A Brief History of Subalternity, in READING 
SUBALTERN STUDIES:  CRITICAL HISTORY, CONTESTED MEANING, AND THE GLOBALISATION 
OF SOUTH ASIA 1, 26 (David Ludden ed., 2001). 
 109. See GAYATRI CHAKRAVORTY SPIVAK, A CRITIQUE OF POSTCOLONIAL REASON:  
TOWARD A HISTORY OF THE VANISHING PRESENT 282–83 (1999) (discussing the 
challenge of considering the subaltern woman as “subject,” a challenge that is 
difficult in part because of the inevitability of comparing the subject to different 
identity categories); GAYATRI CHAKRAVORTY SPIVAK, IN OTHER WORLDS:  ESSAYS IN 
CULTURAL POLITICS 204 (1988) (“Different knotting and configurations . . . , 
determined by heterogeneous determinations which are themselves dependent upon 
myriad circumstances, produce the effect of an operating subject.”); see also Spivak, 
Can the Subaltern Speak?, supra note 12, at 280–81 (“[O]ne must nevertheless insist 
that the colonized subaltern subject is irretrievably heterogeneous.”). 
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this Article teach us about the contribution of detailed, historically 
grounded inquiry.  That is a lesson that has far broader applicability 
than just to subaltern individuals and causes. 
B. The Existentialist Challenge to Law Posed by Critical Postcolonialism 
To understand State v. Shack as a representational problem from a 
postcolonialist perspective, it is important to think about the case as 
an instrument and source of law, and in this case, property law.  This 
Section thus considers the ways in which property law, but also the 
process of legal decision-making, shapes the question of representation. 
Perhaps more than other areas of law, property law appears to 
demand a unitary voice.110  The doctrinal imprimatur of ownership 
may be the driving force behind the search for cohesion in property 
law.  As Shack and so many cases demonstrate, ownership, once 
proven, stands for a great deal.111  Ownership is widely viewed as a 
consolidating force that allocates great control over resources once 
the hurdle of ownership is cleared.112  Its power is more potent by 
virtue of its designation (at least in lay minds) as one of the few most 
fundamental of human rights.113  Over the last decade, a number of 
                                                          
 110. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 355 
(1967) (“In effect, an owner of a private right to use land acts as a broker whose 
wealth depends on how well he takes into account the competing claims of the 
present and the future.”). 
 111. For influential discussions of the importance of property ownership, see GARY 
D. LIBECAP, CONTRACTING FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS 1 (1989) (stating that, in addition to 
defining certain privileges, property rights determine who are the economic actors 
and define the distribution of wealth in a society); Robert C. Ellickson, Property in 
Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1327 (1993) (arguing that allocating individual property 
rights more effectively creates a positive social product than does using group 
ownership); Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719, 1728 
(2004) [hereinafter Smith, Property and Property Rules] (discussing remedies enforcing 
exclusion as a means of protecting ownership). 
 112. Ellickson, supra note 111, at 1369; see also LIBECAP, supra note 111, at 5 
(positing that the thrust of contracting for property rights involves balancing allocations 
for those advantaged and harmed by the assignment of exclusive decision making). 
 113. The public’s response to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo v. City of 
New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005), is one example of such lay opinion coming to a 
head.  See David A. Dana, The Law and Expressive Meaning of Condemning the Poor after 
Kelo, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 365, 365 (2007) (discussing the “firestorm” of legislative 
reform in various states post-Kelo); Katrina Miriam Wyman, The Measure of Just 
Compensation, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 239, 241–42 (2007) (explaining that the Court’s 
decision in Kelo raised questions “about how much compensation governments 
should pay when they take people’s homes” and “generated widespread public 
outrage”); see also George Lefcoe, After Kelo, Curbing Opportunistic TIF-Driven Economic 
Development:  Forgoing Ineffectual Blight Tests; Empowering Property Owners and School 
Districts, 83 TUL. L. REV. 45, 51–52 (2008) (discussing measures taken by states to 
prohibit condemnation of unblighted properties).  See generally D. Benjamin Barros, 
Home as a Legal Concept, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 255, 256 (2006) (explaining that 
“[h]omes are different in meaningful ways from other types of property,” and 
suggesting that “their unique nature [often] justifies a favored legal status”). 
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legal scholars have leveled a powerful critique of ownership as a force 
of consolidation and rational decision-making.114  My purpose in this 
Article is to contribute to that critique by demonstrating that Spivak’s 
basic concern can be captured and applied in property law and that 
doing so can aid the understanding of ownership as just one of many 
useful concepts in deciding property cases. 
But ownership is not the only example of the consolidating 
impulse in property law.  There is something about the control of 
finite resources, which in the case of land and many other forms of 
property are rivalrous in nature, that causes many people to seek 
balance between interests by limiting the number of options or 
“packages” in which ownership can exist—hence, the overarching 
principle of the numerus clausus in property law.115  It appears to be 
widely believed that less consolidation of property rights could lead to 
too much fragmenting of property use, access, marketability, and 
other important features of property ownership.116  Property would 
be under-utilized.117  Information costs would be too high.118  People 
could not function vis-à-vis property in an effective (or efficient) 
manner without such consolidation.  Ownership and, more generally, 
rights to property appear to signify a few really important things.119 
Given this consolidating impulse in property law, cases like Shack 
accentuate the necessary countermoves.  What Shack appears to make 
                                                          
 114. See, e.g., SINGER, ENTITLEMENT, supra note 38, at 6–7 (criticizing the ownership 
model as self-interested and absolutist and one that fails to recognize conflicts with 
other personal rights); Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm, supra note 6, at 747–48 
(arguing that property rights are relational and that, as a result, property owners 
have certain obligations to others); Alexander et al., Progressive Property, supra note 17, 
at 743–44 (conceiving of property as an idea and an institution that promotes values, 
such as full social and political participation).  
 115. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of 
Property:  The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 3–4 (2000) (explaining that 
the principle that property rights only exist in a finite number of forms is seemingly 
universal today); see also Nestor M. Davidson, Standardization and Pluralism in Property 
Law, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1597, 1601 (2008) (“[S]tandardization is a near-universal 
feature of property systems because the phenomenon facilitates the use of property 
law to define, control, and regulate the public aspects of private legal relations with 
respect to things—the foundational top-down element of property law.”); Avihay 
Dorfman, Property and Collective Undertaking:  The Principle of Numerus Clausus, 61 U. 
TORONTO L.J. 467, 468 (2011) (arguing that numerous clausus is “a restriction on 
private legislation of new forms of property right[s]”). 
 116. Ben W.F. Depoorter & Francesco Parisi, Fragmentation of Property Rights:  A 
Functional Interpretation of the Law of Servitudes, 3 GLOBAL JURIST FRONTIERS 1, 19–21 (2003) 
(detailing some of the consequences of over-fragmentation under economic theory). 
 117. See, e.g., Ellickson, supra note 111, at 1369 (espousing the advantages of 
perpetual private property ownership). 
 118. See, e.g., Smith, Property and Property Rules, supra note 111, at 1724 (discussing 
the information-cost advantages of classic property methods). 
 119. As with ownership, this Article disputes this broader consolidating impulse in 
property law. 
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clear is that to effectively overcome property ownership (or 
equivalent rights over resources), the opposition must be unequivocal 
and forceful.120  In a dispute with a property owner over her land, it 
will not do to provide shaded, half-hearted, or (as among a group of 
opponents) conflicting positions or even positions that are less than 
unanimous.  Such equivocation would be seen as simply unfit as a 
basis for overcoming the core right of property ownership.  
Additionally, for this reason, the most powerful bases for opposing 
property ownership seem to have their source in co-equal human 
rights, such as the civil and political rights of speech,121 association,122 
racial equality,123 and life (as in the cases of necessity).124  Indeed, it is 
not just the substance of conflicting rights but often also the process 
by which they are proven and protected that bespeaks the supremacy 
of property in the hierarchy of rights.  Thus, for example, conflicting 
rights may need to be proven by means of “clear and convincing 
evidence,”125 or they may be remedied just with damages rather than 
injunctive relief.126 
This instrumentalist cohesion in property law is undergirded by a 
much more foundational cohesive drive in law more generally.  As 
Karl Llewellyn so artfully expressed in The Bramble Bush, the art of 
using precedent lies in the judge’s (and the lawyer’s) ability to 
“capitaliz[e] welcome precedents” by analogizing the facts and policy 
issues in a given dispute to prior cases that are useful 
“springboard[s]” for deciding the dispute, while also “cutting” away 
“unwelcome precedents” that unhelpfully appear to “bind” the 
                                                          
 120. State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 374–75 (N.J. 1971) (stating that the rights of the 
workers “are too fundamental to be denied on the basis of an interest in real property 
and too fragile to be left to the unequal bargaining strength of the parties”). 
 121. See, e.g., State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615, 630 (N.J. 1980) (formulating a “multi-
faceted test” under the New Jersey law to ascertain the parameters of the rights of 
speech and assembly upon privately-owned property). 
 122. See, e.g., Shack, 277 A.2d at 372 (emphasizing the rights of the migrant 
workers to associate with the defendants and others who sought to provide them with 
essential services). 
 123. See Singer, No Right to Exclude, supra note 61, at 1283, 1297 (“The absolute 
right to exclude, enshrined in the common law, is a relic of the Jim Crow era, and as 
such, authorizes the creation of racially discriminatory practices.”). 
 124. See United States v. Schoon, 955 F.2d 1238, 1239–40 (9th Cir. 1991) (invoking 
the necessity defense in a criminal action against protesters who entered Internal 
Revenue Service offices to protest U.S. actions in El Salvador), amended by 971 F.2d 
193 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 125. See, e.g., Brown v. Gobble, 474 S.E.2d 489, 494 (W. Va. 1996) (claiming most courts 
have used the “clear and convincing” standard to protect important property interests). 
 126. See Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Sharing the Cathedral, 46 CONN. L. REV. 647, 678 
(2013) (arguing that, under an outcome-centered analysis, property disputes should 
lead to an array of outcomes, including injunctions and damages); Smith, Property 
and Property Rules, supra note 111, at 1726–30 (highlighting potential inefficiencies 
associated with paying damages). 
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judge.127  The process of legal decision-making in which judges and 
lawyers use precedent to decide and argue cases fundamentally 
opposes Spivak’s argument that by exposing fragmentation in the 
subaltern subject, we can create the most space for her to speak.  On 
the one hand, legal reasoning requires lawyers to create classes, to 
define them according to certain commonalities, to assign them 
rights, and then to argue that these rights deserve protection because 
similar classes have received protection for similar rights.128  On the 
other hand, Spivak urges lawyers and other “intellectuals” committed 
to a postcolonialist agenda to resist cohesion in representing the 
classes we might seek to protect.129 
C. Theorizing Pragmatic Postcolonialism 
These two systems of “representation” seem so fundamentally 
irreconcilable that an attempt to harmonize them may seem at best 
existential and at worst pointless.  Such an attempt at least raises the 
question whether the particular system of legal decision making 
based on precedent simply is too entrenched a (Western) institution 
to be capable of incorporating a prescriptive version of Spivak’s 
critique except at the margins.  My purpose in this Section is to 
answer that question by theorizing a form of postcolonialist inquiry 
that is sufficiently prescriptive to be capable of being applied at the 
core of property law—to resolve everyday property disputes.  Doing 
so requires me to diverge from pieces of Spivak’s critique, which is 
what I describe in the first part of this Section.  I then describe the 
basic theoretical contours of the more prescriptive version of 
postcolonialism that I advocate applying within property law.  I call it 
“pragmatic postcolonialism.” 
While Spivak provides a quite convincing and forceful critique of 
Western progressive thought, with which I (and many others) 
empathize, her critique can also rightly be described as existentialist 
and, at times, paralyzing.130  At least in law, without class formation, it 
                                                          
 127. K. N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH:  ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 68 (1930) 
(emphasis omitted). 
 128. Id. at 82–84. Civil rights law, with its categories of protected classes, is a 
paradigmatic example.   
 129. Karen Engle repeatedly confronts this conflict between law and 
representation in her recent book.  See KAREN ENGLE, THE ELUSIVE PROMISE OF 
INDIGENOUS DEVELOPMENT:  RIGHTS, CULTURE, STRATEGY 275–77 (2010) (promoting 
economic justice strategies that incorporate an evolving understanding of cultural 
and ethnic identity).  
 130. See, e.g., ASHA VARADHARAJAN, EXOTIC PARODIES:  SUBJECTIVITY IN ADORNO, SAID, 
AND SPIVAK 89 (1995) (arguing that Spivak “uses the master’s tools [to] dismantle the 
master’s house” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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is hard to win pragmatic change.  And if Spivak is right both that 
subaltern individuals have no space in which to speak and articulate 
their own class and that the intervention by an “authority” from the 
outside contributes to their muteness,131 then it is hard to envision a 
pragmatic way forward.  In this respect, Spivak’s critique appears to 
prioritize deconstruction over instrumentalism.132  This is the first 
respect in which I diverge from Spivak’s critique.  While taking 
deeply to heart her call to specify and account for the individual 
details of the lives and histories of subaltern individuals, I claim that 
such an accounting can be accomplished within a prescriptive structure. 
This prescriptive ambition is the basis for my second divergence 
from Spivak.  Spivak is uncompromising in her insistence on the 
importance of separating, and indeed fragmenting, political and 
aesthetic representations of subaltern individuals.133  Her priority 
appears to be the creation of an alternative intellectual history of 
subaltern peoples.134  Given that priority, rhetorical speech can be an 
important tool.  Because Spivak appears to believe that consolidation 
between the political and the aesthetic is the greatest threat to 
subaltern voices, she elevates fragmentation and deconstruction 
above all else.  Given the instrumentalist work of the law, I propose a 
more compromising position on the question of fragmentation.  
Representation in property law simply cannot accommodate Spivak’s 
understanding of representation in its purest form.  I would rather 
incorporate some of her postcolonialist inquiry into property law with 
compromise than none of it without compromise.  This effort at 
accommodation leads me to recognize Spivak’s understanding of 
representation by applying the pure version of her critique to State v. 
Shack.  But my response to her critique in the form of pragmatic 
postcolonialism requires me to focus more on subalternity and voice 
than on her pure vision of representation.  Thus, as is evident from 
                                                          
 131. Spivak, Can the Subaltern Speak?, supra note 12, at 276–77. 
 132. In referencing instrumentalism here, I am primarily making a disciplinary 
point:  as a literary theorist and postcolonial scholar, Spivak has disciplinary space in 
which to critique a set of laws and practices without necessarily feeling the imperative 
to propose a pragmatic alternative.  Because of my disciplinary perspective as a legal 
scholar, I do feel the imperative to propose a pragmatic alternative.  Spivak has a 
freedom that I do not have.  My critique of State v. Shack is instrumentalist because I 
follow it with a proposed alternative to the New Jersey Supreme Court’s analysis and 
disposition of the case. 
 133. Spivak, Can the Subaltern Speak?, supra note 12, at 294–95 (asserting that even 
well-intentioned efforts to give voice to the subaltern are often more appropriately 
characterized as “ferocious standardizing benevolence” that in fact continue to 
silence those voices). 
 134. For numerous perspectives on this agenda, including Spivak’s, see generally 
MAPPING SUBALTERN STUDIES AND THE POSTCOLONIAL (Vinayak Chaturvedi ed., 2000). 
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my application of this theory in Part IV, I propose creating some 
space for fragmented voices within a framework that remains 
grounded in establishing a cohesive class for the purpose of achieving 
certain more commonly defined rights.135  Stated differently, I 
propose a dispute resolution process in which representation 
requires consolidating in some phases and deconsolidating in others. 
These points of difference, then, lead me to state the theoretical 
contours of pragmatic postcolonialism.  First, as distinguished from 
Spivak’s version, my version of postcolonialist theory prioritizes 
rational decision-making equally with the protection of subaltern 
voices.  In so doing, I aim to protect judges’ ability to make the 
difficult choices between conflicting values even though, at times, 
that will narrow the space in which subaltern voices can be heard.136  
My point in doing so is to prioritize the instrumental over the rhetorical. 
Second and relatedly, it does not suffice in my view to give space 
for speech if the speech produces a sense of empowerment without a 
change in the law.  Legal change is the outcome I seek from creating 
room for subalternity in property law.  Thus, in contrast to Spivak, I 
am not as focused on protecting subaltern voice for the purpose of 
creating an accurate historical record.  Nor am I as confident as 
Foucault and perhaps as some of the scholars advocating for the 
importance of individual narratives that there is much independent 
value and achievement in allowing the subaltern to speak for 
herself.137  Rather, I am interested in exposing those voices for the 
purpose of providing legal remedies to subaltern individuals.  From 
this theoretical perspective, fragmentation is still important, but for a 
different reason than that articulated by Spivak.  Rather than serving 
to deconstruct, fragmentation here recognizes that claims and 
remedies must be tailored to the particular individuals who pursue 
them.  Given this difference in purpose, I argue that it is therefore 
not necessary for the fragmentation between political and aesthetic 
representation to be so zealously preserved. 
Third, the subalternity of individuals is a uniquely important 
perspective to probe and protect in property law because it changes 
the nature of the claims and remedies that would best serve those 
individuals.  Postcolonialist history and the particular forms of 
                                                          
 135. See infra Part IV.A. 
 136. See Alexander, Pluralism and Property, supra note 16, at 1019 (discussing the 
imperative of rational decision-making). 
 137. In this respect, my version of pragmatic postcolonialism hues more closely to 
Spivak’s priorities, as distinguished from Foucault’s and those of the other “Western 
intellectuals” whom she critiques.  Spivak, Can the Subaltern Speak?, supra note 12, at 
271, 279. 
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subordination, silencing, social and cultural immobility, lack of 
participation, or even of recognition of the possibilities of 
participation are utterly relevant to the claims that subaltern 
individuals ought to be able to make in property law.  Previewing my 
analysis of State v. Shack, many migrant workers straddle two sets of 
countries, cultures, communities, and economic systems,138 and it is 
simply an injustice only to recognize one set because that is the only 
understanding of “non-owner” or even of “subordinate individual” 
that property law currently accommodates. 
Finally, legal mechanisms exist in our system of precedential 
decision-making for detecting and protecting subaltern voices.  Far 
from being quixotic or illogical, it is quite possible to take advantage 
of some of the most respected features of the common law as a means 
of more robustly attending to subaltern voices.  Three features are 
particularly useful for pragmatic postcolonialism.  The first is the art 
of instrumental storytelling.  The detailing of the facts of an 
individual case not only allows lawyers and judges to determine how 
the case compares to precedent, but it also provides a powerful and 
pragmatic opportunity to expose and protect subalternity.  The 
second feature is that of individualizing a claim once a basic level of 
class conformity has been established.  While it appears critical to 
precedential decision-making to define a group deserving of a 
remedy (for example, tenants) into which a party fits, our common 
law system also shows that this process of class categorization need 
not be the last step in the process of defining a legal claim.139  It is 
possible, for example, to specify particular individual characteristics 
of tenants that would qualify them for legal relief.140  The third 
feature is the enormous capacity of remedies to individualize the 
needs of parties at the point when judges must decide what to do 
about the legal violations they have established.  Thus, even where it 
is only possible or sensible to build a claim just on the basis of class 
membership and harm, the remedial phase of a case can be the point 
at which judges create space for subalternity.  Punitive damages and 
injunctions, for example, can remedy the particular effects of bad 
housing conditions on an individual who is socially or culturally 
                                                          
 138. See infra Part III.A. 
 139. See infra Part IV.A (discussing the personalization of the warranty of 
habitability claim by the court in Hilder v. St. Peter). 
 140. See infra notes 305–08 and accompanying text (explaining that Hilder teaches 
the importance of individualizing claims). 
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marginalized in particular respects.141  The purpose of Part IV is to 
demonstrate the viability of these three features of the common law 
in protecting subaltern voices. 
III. A POSTCOLONIALIST CRITIQUE OF STATE V. SHACK 
In this Part, I deploy Spivak’s theory of subaltern representation to 
critique how the migrant workers were “represented” in State v. Shack.  
Following Spivak’s methodology, I will analyze the various texts that 
the New Jersey Supreme Court considered as it defined the workers’ 
rights vis-à-vis the property owner who claimed trespass.  Ultimately, 
the purposes of this analysis are three-fold.  The first is to trace the 
integration of vertreten and darstellen within each of the major sources 
that the court used to define the class it sought to protect, and then 
the further consolidation of representation by the New Jersey 
Supreme Court into a set of rights powerful enough to overpower the 
landowner’s right to exclude.  The second is to demonstrate how the 
fragmented voices of the migrant workers themselves were lost in the 
process.  The third is to explicate the costs of ignoring those voices. 
While there are doubtless more texts that ought to be relevant to 
this inquiry, at least four sets of texts demand the individualized 
attention I give them in Section A.  The first is the set of texts making 
up the federal Economic Opportunity Act of 1964,142 the 1967 
amendments to that Act,143 and the legislative history of both bills,144 
which the court referenced extensively as supporting the policy 
underlying its decision.145  The second set of texts comprise the 
landlord-tenant law of the State of New Jersey, especially as presented 
by the briefs filed on behalf of the defendants in their appeal to the 
New Jersey Supreme Court.146  The defendants claimed the 
protections of landlord-tenant law as an important basis for 
preserving their own access to the workers.147  The third text is a 
policy paper prepared for the Governor of New Jersey, which the New 
                                                          
 141. See infra notes 291, 317 and accompanying text (noting that punitive 
damages, although not the norm, are available in certain property law cases and 
providing examples where injunctions were issued in property law cases). 
 142. Pub. L. No. 88-452, 78 Stat. 508 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 
2701–3000 (2012)). 
 143. Amendments to the Economic Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 90-222, 81 Stat. 
672 (1967) (codified as amended at scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 144. See infra Part III.A.1 (discussing the legislative history of the original statute 
and the amendments). 
 145. State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 372–73 (N.J. 1971) (explicating that Congress 
recognized the migrant workers’ plight in enacting the Economic Opportunity Act). 
 146. Brief and Appendix of the Defendants-Appellants, Shack, 277 A.2d 369 (No. 
A-275-70) [hereinafter Brief of the Defendants-Appellants]. 
 147. Shack, 277 A.2d at 370–71. 
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Jersey Supreme Court quoted in its opinion.148  The fourth set of texts 
comprise the federal and state labor laws that created and supported 
the structure of migrant farm labor,149 but that the court barely 
acknowledged as relevant to its decision.150  A final text, which I 
discuss in Section B, is the opinion itself, which drew from the other 
texts to construct a cohesive vision of the migrant workers whom it 
sought to protect.  After tracing the court’s construction of the image 
of migrant workers in its opinion, I discuss in Section C the costs 
associated with the court’s representation of the workers. 
A. Differing Representations 
1. The Economic Opportunity Act 
Quite possibly, the textual representations about migrant workers 
that most influenced the court in constructing its own image of the 
workers were those contained in the federal Economic Opportunity 
Act and its legislative history.  As the court stated, although it decided 
the case on the basis of its own state’s common law,151 the “policy 
considerations” underlying its decision were much the same as those 
animating that statute.152  On its face, the purpose of the Economic 
Opportunity Act was to assist the states in developing programs to aid 
migrant workers and their families with “housing, sanitation, 
education, and day care of children.”153  This, then, was vertreten, the 
particular political representation that Congress undertook in the 
1964 Act. 
To accomplish this basic form of political and legal representation 
in response to crisis-level conditions of poverty, the legislative history 
for the 1964 statute painted a vivid picture of the conditions that 
motivated Congress to act.  The Senate report described the 
programs authorized by the Act as assisting “an almost forgotten 
group of the poverty stricken” who had been “trapped” on “a 
                                                          
 148. See generally GOVERNOR’S TASK FORCE ON MIGRANT FARM LABOR, POVERTY IN A 
LAND OF PLENTY:  THE SEASONAL FARM WORKER IN NEW JERSEY (1968) (reporting on a 
study of seasonal farm labor and laborers in New Jersey and proposing policy 
recommendations). 
 149. See infra Part III.A.3.b (discussing relevant federal and state statutes). 
 150. See infra text accompanying notes 215–18 (identifying relevant statutes but 
noting the court did not rely on them to decide Shack). 
 151. Shack, 277 A.2d at 371. 
 152. Id. at 372 (“The policy considerations which underlie [a decision based on 
the Supremacy Clause] may be much the same as those which would be weighed with 
respect to one or more of the constitutional challenges, but a decision in 
nonconstitutional terms is more satisfactory . . . .”).  
 153. Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-452, § 311, 78 Stat. 508, 
525 (1964). 
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treadmill of poverty.”154  Further, the report depicted a class of 
people whose school-aged children were often kept home to work 
with their parents in the fields, whose children fell behind even if 
they went to school because of the frequent moves their families 
made, who lived in unhealthy, unsanitary and overcrowded housing, 
and who (along with their children) were over time being rendered 
superfluous because of the onslaught of new agricultural 
technology.155  In general, the 1964 legislation was imbued with near 
panic about the living conditions of migrant workers—a sense that 
they lived truly in different circumstances from the surrounding 
community.  This sense seemed to translate into programs intended 
to transform—as immediately as possible—Third World conditions 
into First World conditions.  Cars and tents in ditches156 were to be 
replaced with housing, ideally permanent in tenure.157  Child labor 
was to give way to free public education.158  Whatever the norms were 
of the Third World society in which the migrant families originated, 
the urgency was to transition them as quickly as possible to at least 
the subsistence norms of the First World. 
Thus, in 1964, the problem of representation was arguably quite 
simple.  Because Congress sought primarily to address the most 
extreme circumstances of poverty,159 the picture, darstellen, that was 
called up to support this legislative effort was both unadorned and 
compelling.  It was at least plausible to assume that many migrant 
workers did in fact live under the conditions broadly described in the 
portrait of poverty presented in the legislative history for the original 
Act.160  The basic, reactive, and short-term nature of the congressional 
response also suggests that the workers likely would have welcomed 
such a response.  It is hard to imagine, for example, that most 
workers would not have welcomed clean, sanitary and accessible 
housing during the time they worked on farms far away from home. 
Even in this first iteration of the statute, however, Congress 
prioritized the workers’ conditions of life during their periods away 
                                                          
 154. S. REP. NO. 88-1218, at 30 (1964). 
 155. Id. at 30–31. 
 156. S. REP. NO. 90-563, at 63 (1967). 
 157. See id. at 64. 
 158. Id. at 63–64. 
 159. See 88 CONG. REC. 5179 (1964) (statement of Sen. McNamara) (introducing 
the Economic Opportunity Act, “a bill to mobilize the human and financial resources 
of the Nation to combat poverty in the United States”). 
 160. S. REP. NO. 88-1218, at 30 (“In 1962, the migrants’ average earnings were 
$1,123, of which $874 was earned from farmwork.  The median years of school 
completed by migrants over the age of 25 is 6.5, compared to a median of 11 years of 
school for the general population.  Farmworkers are the only group, in fact, whose 
educational achievement has not advanced in the past 20 years.”). 
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from home over their reasons for having chosen the work they chose.  
Just as the colonial British government in India banned the practice 
of widow sacrifice without any real attention to the underlying cause 
of such a practice (whether it was the laws of succession or the 
customs associated with deeply held religious beliefs),161 Congress in 
1964 was responding to the nearly scandalous sense that no one in 
the “land of plenty” should live in ditches.162  The more difficult 
questions of why the workers were forced to leave their homes for 
work far away, how labor and immigration laws contributed to such a 
framework, and what might be done to facilitate their and their 
families’ lives back home, were not as pressing when the portrait was 
one of such embarrassing levels of poverty in the United States. 
In 1967, the Act was amended both in furtherance of that original 
purpose of political representation and in pursuit of a somewhat 
more abstract political cause.  “The purpose[. . .] [was] to assist 
migrant and seasonal farmworkers and their families to improve their 
living conditions and develop skills necessary for a productive and 
self-sufficient life in an increasingly complex and technological 
society.”163  Thus, while the Amendments expanded support for 
housing (redoubling efforts to provide temporary and emergency 
shelters in addition to long-term homeownership opportunities) as 
well as education, they also added funds for “occupational training to 
respond to the changing demands in agricultural employment.”164  
Moreover, the 1967 Amendments more explicitly supported such 
integrationist efforts by providing for “legal advice and 
representation, and consumer training and counseling” and by 
promoting “community acceptance of such persons.”165 
The two sets of texts, from 1964 and 1967, suggest a crystallizing 
sense of what it really meant to be a part of the First World.  Such an 
existence seemingly involved not just sanitation and education, but 
                                                          
 161. See Spivak, Can the Subaltern Speak?, supra note 12, at 297–99 (suggesting that 
the British abolishment of widow sacrifice was not a result of the problems with the 
practice itself, but rather a result of British imperialism and imposition of British 
customs on Indian culture). 
 162. S. REP. NO. 88-1218, at 117. 
 163. Economic Opportunity Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-222, § 311, 81 
Stat. 672, 709 (1967) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2946 (2012)).  The 
legislative history of the 1967 Amendments began with a quotation from a seasonal 
farmworker in New Mexico that expressed this more abstract representational 
undertaking:  “The aim is to provide skills so they can do other work and provide 
them with a wider variety of skills to make them better workers off and on the farm, 
hopefully to be able to command a higher wage.”  S. REP. NO. 90-563, at 63 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 164. S. REP. NO. 90-563, at 64. 
 165. Id. 
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also the meaningful prospect of long-term and sustainable 
employment, housing, and consumption in the new community.  
Correlatively, the 1967 Amendments conveyed a portrait, darstellen, of 
the migrant workers as a class excluded from access to a stable society 
in which economic and political opportunities were accessible to 
everyone, no matter how poor one’s origin.  This sense of isolation 
and separation pervaded both sets of texts, but the question of what 
the workers were separated from was much more explicitly about 
long-term participation in the 1967 Amendments. 
From this pair of legislative pronouncements, then, it is possible to 
perceive a set of claims about the political desires and needs of the 
migrant workers as a class.  In short, they were depicted as a group 
that was deeply isolated but that yearned for integration into the 
American middle class.  The statutes did not include protections 
directed toward migrant workers who intended to stay in the United 
States for only a short while, who sought work in this country for the 
purpose of sending money back home, or who preferred to keep 
their children by their sides rather than sending them for education 
in a land which they might not view as home.166  There was no 
obvious evidence that the workers, as a class, desired training in the 
ways of Western-style consumerism, but such a desire was entrenched 
in the legislation.167  Indeed, there was no political recognition of 
these workers having a home other than the idealized pursuit of the 
homes of the people in the surrounding communities. 
A far more elaborate and integrated portrait of the workers was 
required to buttress this more significant and complex form of 
political representation.  Perhaps nothing in the hundreds of pages 
of legislative history for the 1967 Amendments could exemplify this 
move towards more detailed portraiture better than a psychological 
study of the migrant workers prepared by Dr. Robert Coles, a Harvard 
psychiatrist.168  While there are many claims worth pausing over in 
                                                          
 166. See Economic Opportunity Amendments of 1967 § 311 (providing assistance 
to migrant farm workers “for a productive and self-sufficient life”); Economic 
Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-452, § 2, 78 Stat. 508, 508 (1964) (declaring 
that the Act was intended to ensure every person has a chance to participate fully in 
U.S. society). 
 167. The primary motivation for such consumer education may well have been to 
respond to the trickery and fraud many workers experienced even when buying basic 
provisions such as food.  See generally FARM WORKER DIV., CAMDEN REG’L LEGAL SERVS., 
INC., REPORT OF THE PROJECT DIRECTOR (1970) (constituting an unpublished report 
filed as an appendix with the brief of the defendants on appeal to the Supreme 
Court of New Jersey in State v. Shack). 
 168. See S. REP. NO. 91-83, at 13–18 (1969) (quoting an excerpt from Dr. Robert 
Coles’ study suggesting that migrant workers are part of a U.S. “sub-culture” because 
they are physically, culturally, and emotionally isolated from “the rest of us”). 
DYAL-CHAND.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 11/7/2014  12:41 PM 
2014] PRAGMATISM AND POSTCOLONIALISM 1715 
this extraordinary report, the overarching point to make about it is 
that the proponents of the 1967 Amendments apparently believed 
that support for their broader integrationist efforts required them to 
present a picture of the workers as deeply psychologically (as well as 
physically) harmed by the conditions of their work on the farms.169  
Unfortunately, however, this portraiture was accomplished by a 
medical professional who existed worlds apart from the workers and 
whose account of their psychological profile appeared to be based 
largely on his observations of their reactions to their circumstances.170 
Moreover, unsurprisingly, Dr. Coles’s observations were filtered 
through the lens in which “normal” was middle class American—a 
norm in which property rights were paramount and hard work led to 
an existence defined by a nuclear family who lived and played 
together.171  Thus, for example, Dr. Coles stated, “there is no 
comparing the unstable, disorganized social life of migrants with that 
of the large majority of Americans.”172  He reduced the workers to a 
group of “unreliable, unkempt,” untidy people who were “willfully 
destructive of property” as an expression of their “hostility” and 
“resentment” towards their employers.173  It was no wonder that he 
could hardly blame the “many intelligent growers” who employed 
them for concluding that they were “generally a discouraging and 
depressing lot, unresponsive to aid, sullen before advice, ill-suited 
even for more money or better working and living conditions.”174  He 
painted a picture of the workers as fundamentally incompetent, 
pitiful, and needful of federal intervention because of their own 
inadequacies rather than the avarice or exploitation of the employers.175 
What began in the 1964 legislation as an emergency response to 
basic needs transformed by 1967 into a rather nuanced response to a 
                                                          
 169. Id. at 13–14. 
 170. Id. at 18 (noting that Dr. Robert Coles had observed and studied farm 
workers for six years). 
 171. Cf. GEORGE MASNICK & MARY JO BANE, THE NATION’S FAMILIES:  1960–1990 25 
(1980) (“By 1970 very few people who did not live alone lived with someone other 
than their spouse or their children.  The households in which the younger 
generation grew up had become standardized to include one to three siblings (two 
to four years different in age), two parents (approximately 25 years older), and no 
one else.”). 
 172. S. REP. NO. 91-83, at 14. 
 173. Id. at 16.  Dr. Coles’s interest in the workers’ attitude toward property is 
anything but marginal to his psychological profiling.  Elsewhere in his report, for 
example, he describes the workers as not caring about “permanent possessions.”  Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 174. Id. 
 175. See id. at 16–18 (grounding his arguments in favor of aid in the incompetence 
and neediness of the migrant workers).  I am grateful to Joseph William Singer for 
clarifying this distinctive basis for the federal legislation.   
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presumably elaborate set of desires to join a new social and economic 
society.  This more expansive response was supported by a mounting 
sense of the workers as basically inadequate and as requiring a much 
more extensive set of interventions to fix them.  It is not even clear if 
the half million migrant workers would, as a class, have chosen the 
forms of housing and education that were offered to them on an 
emergency basis in the original legislation.  But it is a far more 
extreme assumption to believe that, as a class, they would have 
chosen integration in the form in which it was offered to them in 
1967.  It is not exaggeration to say that while the federal statute 
worked hard to provide expansive remedies to migrant and seasonal 
workers, it may well have been providing the wrong remedies. 
2. New Jersey landlord-tenant law 
Compare this representation of the migrant workers with one set of 
claims made about them in the briefs filed on behalf of the 
defendants in State v. Shack.  There is a great deal that we do not 
know about the defendants’ perceptions of the workers they claimed 
as clients.  But we can at least glean a few salient assumptions and 
interests from the opinion and the briefs filed in the case.  Beginning 
with the question of what the defendants’ own interests were, the 
defendants appeared quite fervently to believe that the migrant 
workers needed their services.  The briefs filed on appeal to the New 
Jersey Supreme Court, as well as the reports filed in the appendices to 
those briefs, suggest some important differences in the perceptions of 
service providers, such as Shack and Tejeras, as contrasted with the 
picture of the migrant workers presented in the federal legislation. 
Specifically, these and other service providers presented 
innumerable and detailed examples of the exploitation by the 
employers and the corresponding helplessness of the migrant 
workers in responding to this exploitation.  They described the 
frequent use of extreme and, at times, near fatal beatings as a means 
of disciplining workers and discouraging them from seeking 
protections.176  They told many stories of living conditions that 
resulted in dangerous health problems, especially for the young 
children of the workers.177  They provided many examples of 
employers taking advantage of the criminal law to pursue the arrest 
                                                          
 176. FARM WORKER DIV., supra note 167, at 10–11. 
 177. Id. at 6 (“In one case, a Puerto Rican man, his wife and five children lived in a 
three-room affair above a chicken coop.  One of the children, a small girl, twice had 
been seriously ill, suffering from respiratory problems caused by the fowl smell 
pervading the living quarters.”). 
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and criminal prosecution of workers who sought aid from third 
parties.178  And perhaps the most frequent examples of exploitation 
were tricks and outright refusals of employers to pay the (already 
depressed) wages that had been earned by the workers.179  These 
examples focused primarily on the flagrantly manipulative and 
abusive behavior of the employers without dwelling nearly as much 
on the inadequacies of the workers.  By contrast, the federal 
legislation appeared to rely on the workers’ helplessness and 
weakness as a basis for federal intervention.180 
From these court filings, what one would expect from reading the 
famous New Jersey Supreme Court opinion becomes obvious:  the 
defendants’ primary interest was in preserving their own access to the 
migrant workers so that they could continue to document and 
address at least the worst abuses that they were just beginning to 
discover at the time the case was filed.181  This is an utterly 
understandable interest, one with which most lawyers would 
empathize deeply.  The defendants and similarly situated service 
providers could not help the workers if they could not access them.  
And in this respect, the New Jersey Supreme Court’s quotation from 
the Governor’s Report on migrant labor was perhaps the most 
important rhetorical statement in the opinion:  “‘no trespass’ signs 
represent the last dying remnants of paternalistic behavior.”182  But it 
is equally obvious that this interest could only overlap or be shared 
with the workers’ own interests and perspectives up to a point.  
Specifically, the interests of the migrant workers that service 
providers like the defendants were in the best position to address 
were their interests in decent living conditions, safe work conditions, 
and fair wages while they worked on the farms.  These were critical 
interests, of course.  But they were not the workers’ only needs or 
interests.  In short, as the legislative history suggests, they did not 
encompass the needs and interests of the workers off the farms and 
in other parts of their lives and relationships.183 
The defendants’ particular interest in access to farms such as 
Tedesco’s, which allowed them to address a particular subset of the 
                                                          
 178. Id. at 12–18. 
 179. Id. at 8–10. 
 180. See supra Part III.A.1 (detailing the history and purpose of the Economic 
Opportunity Act and its amendments). 
 181. See generally FARM WORKER DIV., supra note 167. 
 182. State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 373 (N.J. 1971). 
 183. See S. REP. NO. 91-83, at 2 (1969) (focusing on migrant workers’ ability to fill 
“the crucial needs at harvest time”); S. REP. NO. 90-563, at 63 (1967) (explaining that 
programs were authorized for “housing, sanitation, education, and day care for 
children” with no mention of any other area). 
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workers’ interests, in turn dictated the legal claims and rights that the 
defendants and their attorneys used as vehicles for protecting those 
interests.  Turning then to the interests of the workers, those interests 
had to be defined as rights that the defendants could convince the 
court existed at the time of the litigation.  In 1970, and today, one of 
the most obvious legal rights that would compel a court to grant 
access to a private owner’s property was the right of a tenant to 
receive visitors.184  Such a right was powerful enough to be recognized 
as a consistent basis for limiting a property owner’s right to exclude 
because it was well established that once a landlord opened her 
property to tenants, those tenants shared a property interest in that 
property.185  But it was also a right that explicitly acknowledged the 
right of third parties who were guests of those tenants to access the 
property as well.186 
In short, because of their intense desire to connect with the 
migrant workers, the defendants painted a picture of the migrant 
workers as most desperately needing those things that the defendants 
were able to provide.  It was not even the full set of needs of the 
migrant workers on the farms that the defendants themselves had 
identified that they sought to protect, but rather the workers’ needs 
as tenants.187  The federal statutes defined migrant workers as trapped 
in a system of poverty that isolated them from integration into middle 
class America, an integration that the legislation assumed they 
desired.188  By contrast, the defendants defined the migrant workers 
as tenants—much like any other tenant in the State of New Jersey.189  
The New Jersey Supreme Court recognized that the class of “tenant” 
                                                          
 184. See, e.g., State v. DeCoster, 653 A.2d 891, 895 (Me. 1995) (finding an 
employer violated the Civil Rights Act by erecting signs prohibiting entry by non-
employees into a mobile home park and threatening employee tenants with violence 
if they brought visitors to the park).  Hence the Court’s statement that “this case 
understandably included the question whether the migrant worker should be 
deemed to be a tenant and thus entitled to the tenant’s right to receive visitors.”  
Shack, 277 A.2d at 374. 
 185. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm, supra note 6, at 807; see also Singer, No 
Right to Exclude, supra note 61, at 1456 (listing several examples of relationships that 
raise issues over conflicting property rights, including relationships between 
landlords and their tenants). 
 186. Shack, 277 A.2d at 374 (citing Williams v. Lubbering, 63 A. 90, 91 (N.J. Sup. 
Ct. 1906)).   
 187. To be clear, this was not the only argument in the defendants’ brief.  They 
also presented a forceful argument on First Amendment grounds that the migrant 
workers had the right to receive information of the sort that the defendants were 
trying to communicate to them.  Brief of the Defendants-Appellants, supra note 146, 
at 17–18. 
 188. See supra Part III.A.1 (detailing the history and purpose of the federal legislation). 
 189. Brief of the Defendants-Appellants, supra note 146, at 36. 
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did not fully overlap with the class of “migrant worker.”190  There was, 
as the court observed, dissonance between the two.191  What the court 
failed to recognize was that the dissonance was partly attributable to 
the fact that each of these classes was not homogenous.  Each 
contained shards of desire, need, and perspective that could not be 
represented or remedied fully by treatment of the individuals in these 
classes as homogenous.  In that respect, the court did not recognize 
one critical feature of their subalternity. 
Moreover, the defendants’ choice to seek protection for accessing 
the workers by means of landlord-tenant law came with its own 
accouterments.  By arguing that the migrant workers were tenants 
with all the rights available to tenants in the State of New Jersey, the 
defendants effectively argued that their clients had both the desire 
and the capacity to protect themselves using the landlord-tenant law 
of the state.192  This argument implied also that the workers could 
engage with the landowner who employed and housed them as any 
other employee or tenant would be able to do in the State of New 
Jersey.193  This is because both employment law and landlord-tenant 
law are grounded in the generalized belief that participants in a 
contract have the independence of will, action, and judgment to 
protect themselves by achieving the benefits of a given bargain.194  In 
these respects, the defendants represented the workers as having 
made much progress in achieving integration.  Rather than being 
isolated, the defendants implied that the workers were ready to enjoy 
                                                          
 190. Shack, 277 A.2d at 374 (exploring the question of whether a migrant worker 
should be considered a tenant). 
 191. See id. (noting that the cases cited did not involve employment relationships 
like those of the migrant workers and Tedesco). 
 192. Id. 
 193. See id. (considering whether migrant workers have a possessory or “merely 
incidental” relationship with their employers’ property). 
 194. For discussions and critiques of these assumptions in both areas of 
contracting, see Joseph W. Singer, Things That We Would Like to Take for Granted:  
Minimum Standards for the Legal Framework of a Free and Democratic Society, 2 HARV. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 139, 143 (2008) (discussing the law’s anti-paternalistic approach of not 
requiring mandatory terms in contracts allows people the liberty to “determine the 
course of their own lives”); Franklin G. Snyder, The Pernicious Effect of Employment 
Relationships on the Law of Contracts, 10 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 33, 34 (2003) (arguing 
that classic contract theory is an inappropriate method to interpret important social 
relationships such as employment law); Clyde W. Summers, The Rights of Individual 
Workers:  The Contract of Employment and the Rights of Individual Employees:  Fair 
Representation and Employment at Will, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 1082, 1082 (1984) 
(explaining the “reemergence” of the individual employment contract as a form of 
extralegal protection against arbitrary employer action).  See generally Alan Schwartz, 
Justice and the Law of Contracts:  A Case for the Traditional Approach, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 107, 107 (1986) (contending that the justice of contract law is allowing people 
to make unrestrained choice which requires the state to ensure an environment in 
which people can make choices to “maximize[] their own utility”). 
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the benefits of affiliation and social engagement but for the blunt 
intervention of the landowner exercising his right to exclude (and 
thus to isolate).195 
In fact, Shack and Tejeras may have thought nothing of the kind, 
but the only precedent that they had available to them in support of 
their legal claim of access grounded in the rights of a tenant were 
cases that contained that fully constructed set of assumptions about 
tenants, their rights, and their relationships to landlords.196  Thus, as 
the New Jersey Supreme Court discussed, the cases the defendants 
cited in their briefs analyzed the question of what process ought to be 
available to the parties when litigating a breach of this particular 
form of contract, with the assumption that process was all that was 
required to support the migrant workers in the pursuit of their 
rights.197  In Schuman v. Zurawell,198 for example, the court appeared 
to assume that the parties had reached a rational and mutually 
advantageous bargain about their respective rights to the property on 
which the employee was housed.199  It was assumed that the rights had 
been defined in the contract.200  All that was required was a signaling 
from the court about the sufficiency of notice under the contract.201  
Reliance on such cases suggested that the workers had chosen from 
among a range of options in deciding to accept part of their 
remuneration in the form of housing on their employers’ property, 
rather than that this condition had been imposed on them without 
any appearance of options. 
As represented by the federal legislation, the workers were isolated 
and helpless.  As represented by the defendants, the workers were 
capable of class affiliation and of protecting themselves using the 
mainstream approach of contracting for rights.  As a matter of 
property law, the court had a choice to make. 
3. Other texts 
Two other sets of texts are worthy of brief mention in this analysis.  
The first is a policy report prepared for the Governor of New Jersey 
                                                          
 195. Shack, 277 A.2d at 374. 
 196. Id. (stating that the cases cited by the defendants focused on the rights of 
employer-landlords to remove discharged employees and the judicial processes that 
employer-landlords needed to follow).  
 197. Id. 
 198. 47 A.2d 560 (Essex Cnty. Ct. 1946). 
 199. Id. at 560 (stating the parties had agreed that the defendants would act as 
a building superintendent and janitor in exchange for payment and the use of 
an apartment). 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. at 560–61. 
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concerning the lives and needs of migrant and seasonal workers in 
New Jersey; this report contributed to the court’s portrayal of the 
workers.  The second set of texts is a set of federal and state laws 
governing the conditions and rights of the workers as workers.  These 
laws are important both because of their largely invisible 
contributions to the structure of migrant labor in the United States 
and because they should have been so much more relevant to the 
court’s property analysis. 
a. Report of the Governor’s Task Force on migrant farm labor 
In addition to using the Economic Opportunity Act as a text 
through which to understand and ultimately to represent the migrant 
workers, the New Jersey Supreme Court also referenced a 150-page 
policy paper titled Poverty in a Land of Plenty:  The Seasonal Farm Worker 
in New Jersey, Report of the Governor’s Task Force on Migrant Farm Labor.202  
While this report could have provided a more detailed and 
individualized portrait of migrant workers in New Jersey, it largely 
failed to do so.  Instead, the report reinforced the portrait already 
constructed by the court on the basis of the federal legislation. 
In its introduction, the report provided relatively detailed statistics 
about migrant workers in New Jersey.203  In addition to detailing the 
number of workers in New Jersey, the report focused on 
demographics.  For example, the report provided information about 
the national origin and race (Puerto Rican and African American 
workers appeared to predominate), approximate ages, earnings, and 
family connections of the workers in that state.204  But these details 
comprised two of the report’s 151 pages.  The great bulk of 
information the report provided about the migrant workers in New 
Jersey was more general, matching the abstraction in much of the 
Economic Opportunity Act’s legislative history.  Indeed, the report 
cited the same Harvard psychiatrist, Richard Coles, to paint (not 
surprisingly) much the same portrait found in the history of the 
federal legislation.205 
                                                          
 202. Shack, 277 A.2d at 373. 
 203. GOVERNOR’S TASK FORCE ON MIGRANT FARM LABOR, POVERTY IN A LAND OF 
PLENTY:  THE SEASONAL FARM WORKER IN NEW JERSEY 15–16 (1968) [hereinafter 
POVERTY IN A LAND OF PLENTY] (providing a few details concerning Puerto Rican 
contract and non-contract workers, local workers, and interstate workers). 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. at 17–19 (suggesting the “myth” that migrant workers are “lazy and good-
for-nothing . . . has been largely destroyed by recent psychological findings” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); see supra notes 168–75 and accompanying text (providing 
details of Dr. Coles’ portrait of migrant workers in the legislative history of the 
Economic Opportunity Amendments). 
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This was a lost opportunity.  Rather than giving a more nuanced 
picture of the workers that was sensitive to place, history, and local 
conditions, the report reinforced the same abstract themes and 
claims developed by the federal statute.206  The result was a specific 
set of policy recommendations that was regularly quite integrationist 
in perspective.207  The report detailed only a few of the most 
egregious incidents of mistreatment—far fewer than, for example, 
the reports filed by Camden Legal Services as appendices to the 
defendants’ briefs.208  What it provided instead was thematically 
compelling language that the New Jersey Supreme Court could use to 
further consolidate its image of the workers as desperately isolated 
and in need of significant intervention and support.  In particular, by 
detailing the egregiously isolating behavior of some of the farm 
owners as well as the workers’ inability to respond (because of 
language differences, lack of information about legal protections, 
and other factors), the report added ballast to the court’s conclusion 
that property law was part of the problem.209  Thanks to the report’s 
rhetorical force, the court was able to target the “no trespass” signs 
that constrained legal aid.210 
b. State and federal labor and employment laws 
At least one more set of texts fundamentally shaped the rights of 
the migrant workers on Tedesco’s farm.  However, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court only obliquely and fleetingly touched on these in 
defining the workers’ rights.  These texts were the state and federal 
laws that governed the work lives of the migrant workers, including 
laws governing the hours worked and safety requirements of the 
work,211 laws establishing the minimum wage,212 and laws governing 
                                                          
 206. See generally POVERTY IN A LAND OF PLENTY, supra note 203, at 17–19 (detailing 
the physical and linguistic separateness of migrant workers and local residents). 
 207. It should be acknowledged that the policy recommendations in this report 
were more sensitive to the state of “emergency” in which the workers lived, often 
recommending health care and other services on-site at labor camps.  But the 
recommendations also included, for example, detailed educational 
recommendations that seemed designed to integrate migrant children more fully 
into long-term educational participation.  See id. at 89–91.  
 208. Id. at 21–22 (providing examples of the migrant workers’ “substandard and at 
times inhumane living conditions” and of discrimination against migrant workers). 
 209. State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 373 (N.J. 1971). 
 210. Id.  
 211. See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-718, §§ 7, 12, 52 Stat. 
1060, 1063, 1067 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 207(a)(1), 212(a) (2012)) 
(introducing, among other things, a maximum hour work week and prohibiting 
forms of oppressive child labor).  In New Jersey, the New Jersey Division of Workers’ 
Compensation and the Wage and Hour Compliance Division, both within the 
Department of Labor and Workforce Development, oversaw state-level regulations.  
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the rights of workers to organize.213  At the most basic level, as this 
brief section discusses, both affirmatively and by lack of prohibition, 
these laws allowed the system of seasonal and migrant farm labor to 
develop and flourish.  It is well beyond the scope of this Article to 
trace how, but the support of interstate labor combined with the 
resistance to international standards for workers appears to have 
contributed to the system of migrant and seasonal labor that many rightly 
view as trapping workers in a structure of poverty and exploitation.214 
By means of selective application, federal and state laws 
contributed to this system.  For example, the 1966 Amendments to 
the Fair Labor Standards Act gave some, but not all, agricultural 
workers the right to the minimum wage.215  The defendants pointed 
out in their briefs that the right to organize under the National Labor 
Relations Act was unavailable to the workers.216  It appears that laws 
concerning child labor, worker safety and health, and maximum 
hours applied to the migrant workers, but they did not account for 
the particular details of migrant workers’ lives; as a result, they did 
not prevent some of the worst abuses.217  Moreover, as the 
defendants’ briefs (and the copious appendices to those briefs) 
discuss, even these laws were often not enforced in New Jersey and 
                                                          
Laws and Regulations, DEP’T LAB. & WORKFORCE DEV., http://lwd.dol.state.nj.us 
/labor/wagehour/lawregs/wage_and_hour_laws.html (last visited Aug. 7, 2014) 
(explaining that the Wage and Hour Compliance Division enforces state minimum 
wage and child labor requirements and providing legal resources); Legal Information, 
DEP’T LAB. & WORKFORCE DEV., http://lwd.dol.state.nj.us/labor/wc/legal/legal_index.html 
(last visited Aug. 7, 2014) (providing legal resources for workers’ compensation). 
 212. 52 Stat. at 1062–63.  
 213. These laws included the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, Pub. L. No. 
80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.), and the 
National Labor Relations Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (codified as 
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2012)). 
 214. See, e.g., Jennifer Gordon, Transnational Labor Citizenship, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 
503, 505 (2007) (advocating for cross-border worker organizations as a measure to 
improve working conditions for migratory workers); Juan Carlos Linares Hired Hands 
Needed:  The Impact of Globalization and Human Rights Law on Migrant Workers in the 
United States, 34 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 321, 329–37 (2006) (discussing examples of 
formal U.S.-funded programs which demonstrate that “[m]igrant workers represent 
an easily discardable labor pool, bestowed with few rights” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); Sarah H. Paoletti, Transnational Responses to Transnational Exploitation:  A 
Proposal For Bi-National Migrant Rights Clinics, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1171, 1171–72 
(2009) (highlighting several examples of abuses and legal violations that migrant 
workers face).  
 215. See Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601, § 302, 80 
Stat. 830, 838 (1966) (setting minimum wage at “not less than $1 an hour” for first 
year of work, escalating to “not less than $1.30 an hour” after two years of work). 
 216. Brief of the Defendants-Appellants, supra note 146, at 30. 
 217. See S. REP. NO. 91-83, at 51–61, 76–81 (1969) (recommending changes to 
federal and state minimum wage provisions, childcare, and unemployment 
compensation provisions to account for agricultural workers’ particular needs). 
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across the United States.218  These were in effect background texts 
that deeply affected the workers’ lives when they were on the job, but 
that the court did not acknowledge as relevant to its decision.  It is 
particularly remarkable that these laws seemed so invisible given the 
overriding perception of these workers as defined (indeed, labeled) 
by their work. 
Although the federal labor laws will remain largely unexplored 
here, they are worth mentioning for two reasons.  First, there can be 
little doubt that these laws reinforced both the political and aesthetic 
presentations—and representations—that the New Jersey Supreme 
Court felt were required in the course of protecting the workers.  The 
recognition that the workers could not rely on laws protecting their 
right to organize or their human rights surely contributed to the 
court’s sense that they had few options and thus required the court’s 
intervention.  The paucity of rights in this arena also contributed to 
the sense of the workers as “trapped.”219 
Second, the images these laws produced ought to have been much 
more relevant to the court’s property analysis than they were.  At a 
basic level, the workers’ rights and needs ought to have served as 
meaningful counterforces to Tedesco’s right to exclude.220  But it also 
seems likely that consideration of the workers’ rights as workers would 
have fragmented the court’s portrayal of them.  Some may have had 
strong claims of labor exploitation against Tedesco; others might not 
have had them.  Some may have been entitled to minimum wage; 
others might not have been.  But pressure to present the strongest 
and most cohesive claim against Tedesco’s right to exclude required 
the court to avoid these compelling questions.  Doing any more in 
this Article other than to make this basic point would be to engage in 
a highly hypothetical exercise.  But it should be clear at least from 
this brief discussion that the court’s failure to consider labor 
considerations is a significant cost of failing to paint a more accurate 
picture of the migrant workers the court sought to protect. 
                                                          
 218. See, e.g., FARM WORKER DIV., supra note 167, at 4 (stating that farm workers 
were often abused and victimized by the governmental agencies assigned to assist 
them); id. at 11–19 (describing the inattention by law enforcement agencies to 
physical abuse by crew leaders and other agents of the employers). 
 219. Id. at 20–21. 
 220. Indeed, this case is analogous to the famous case of Local 1330, United Steel 
Workers of America v. U.S. Steel Corp., 631 F.2d 1264 (6th Cir. 1980), in this respect:  in 
both cases, the workers’ rights should have limited the property owners’ rights. In 
United Steel Workers, the steelworkers’ rights should have served as meaningful 
counterforces to the steel company’s right to close the steel mills. 631 F.2d at 1265.  
Professor Singer discusses this point with respect to State v. Shack in Singer, Reliance 
Interest, supra note 8, at 676–77. 
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B. The New Jersey Supreme Court’s Opinion 
Modeling Llewellyn’s “skilful judge,” who with the astute 
management of “welcome” and “unwelcome” precedents, can build a 
forceful rationale for her decision,221 the New Jersey Supreme Court 
deployed these texts to develop a highly unified and convincing 
picture of the migrant workers who lived on Tedesco’s farm. 
The first step was to build a class that had meaningful instrumental 
value.  For this purpose, the federal statutes and their legislative 
history were enormously helpful because these texts defined the 
“economic conditions of existence that cut off their mode of life, 
their interest, and their formation from those of the other classes.”222  
These economic conditions not only involved the most basic, even 
reductionist, sense of what constitutes adequate shelter and 
education, but also a more refined sense of what it means to 
participate in a new economic and social community so that what the 
court ultimately expounded upon was the right of the workers “to live 
with dignity.”223  What the court omitted, except in the most confined 
sense, was any analysis of whether the workers classified themselves in 
this fashion or whether they identified with this classification. 
This representation of the migrant workers also left little or no 
room for the possibility that they were a liberated class of individuals 
capable of protecting themselves by means of contract law and 
norms.  Thus, the court pointedly concluded that the rights of the 
workers were “too fragile to be left to the unequal bargaining 
strength of the parties.”224  First-year students may wonder why 
landlord-tenant law was not a perfectly viable basis for the court’s 
decision, but reliance on this strain of jurisprudence would have 
carried with it too many assumptions about the rights and 
responsibilities of the class.  It would have prevented the court from 
pursuing the workers’ need for the dignification that accompanies 
middle class life rather than simply the necessities of subsistence.225 
The consolidating imperative of creating a class thus left the court 
with no option but to represent the migrant workers.  In this respect, 
                                                          
 221. Llewellyn, supra note 127, at 73 (“He can throw the decision this way or that.  
But not freely.”). 
 222. Spivak, Can the Subaltern Speak?, supra note 12, at 276 (internal quotation 
marks omitted); see also supra notes 211–13 and accompanying text (describing, in brief, 
the purpose of several federal statutes that benefited migrant workers specifically).  
 223. State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 374 (N.J. 1971). 
 224. Id. at 374–75.  Similarly, the court concluded that “the needs of the 
occupants may be so imperative and their strength so weak, that the law will deny the 
occupants the power to contract away what is deemed essential to their health, 
welfare, or dignity.”  Id. at 372. 
 225. Id. at 373. 
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the court reenacted exactly what Spivak has argued occurs when a class 
is and is not a class:  “Their representative must appear simultaneously 
as their master, as an authority over them, as unrestricted 
governmental power that protects them from the other classes[.]”226 
The court used a full range of rhetorical devices to justify this 
formidable role.  It relied on the report of the Governor’s task force 
to further reduce and consolidate the voices of the migrant 
workers.227  It defined its own role to protect the “well-being” of the 
workers as “the paramount concern of a system of law.”228  It 
described the workers, overridingly, as “rootless and isolated,” 
“outside the mainstream,” “unorganized[,] and without economic or 
political power.”229 
The court’s view of its role and of the defendants’ role was 
apparent well before it began to describe its holding.  The migrant 
workers were a voiceless class for whom the court and the defendants 
had to speak.  There was nothing evidently gained or lost from 
considering what it would have meant to designate the workers as 
parties to the case.  I refer here not to the technical irrelevance of the 
workers as parties to a criminal case.  Rather, reimagining the case a 
bit more broadly as a civil trespass dispute, I refer to the substantive, 
legal irrelevance of the workers as parties to a case in which the 
owner’s right to exclude clashed with the civil right of association and 
the more amorphous human right to live with dignity.  As a legal 
matter, individuals other than the workers were better able to 
represent the workers’ rights.  The portrait of the workers was more 
clearly presented by others—Shack, Tejeras, and ultimately, the New 
Jersey Supreme Court. 
As a consequence, there is really no evidence of one or more 
“subaltern” voices in State v. Shack.  There are no quotations from trial 
testimony or affidavits given by the two workers with whom the 
defendants tried to meet.  We have no information about whether 
the workers preferred to meet in their camp or off-site.  We have no 
information about how important it was to them to meet with the 
defendants at all.  To the extent this absence is arresting for the 
reader, the court directs the reader’s attention to the perception of 
the workers as unable to speak for themselves:  “[t]hey are rootless 
and voiceless.”230  If we look hard, we can find the voice of a single 
                                                          
 226. Spivak, Can the Subaltern Speak?, supra note 12, at 277. 
 227. Shack, 277 A.2d at 373. 
 228. Id. at 372.  
 229. Id. at 372–73. 
 230. Id. at 372.  
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seasonal worker in the form of a quotation in the legislative history 
for the 1967 amendments to the Economic Opportunity Act.231  As a 
legal matter, what is so effective about the portrait of the workers is 
the unified image that it presents.  It is clear from this image what the 
law can do to protect the workers. 
C. Subaltern Voices:  Why Did They Matter in State v. Shack? 
The pragmatic posture of this Article requires me to do more than 
simply argue that the Shack court ignored the perspectives of those 
whom it sought to protect.  It requires me to say why that mattered.  
If the court was able to achieve a significant inroad into rights of 
exclusion for the benefit of many subordinate non-owners with little 
or no costs for those among them who fit the category of “subaltern,” 
then (despite Spivak’s objections) lawyers might conclude that the 
court made the right choices.  But there were costs—indeed 
potentially significant costs—and one of the concerning features of 
the case is that the costs have been so hidden from our view.  The 
purpose of this Section is to illuminate those costs. 
In an Article dedicated to unearthing the subaltern voice in 
property law, it is well to begin by stressing that the bluntest cost of 
consolidating the voices and interests of the migrant workers—at 
least in this case—was to produce a holding that explicitly protected 
only the right of other people to access the workers.232  The case did 
not protect the workers’ rights outside Tedesco’s farm, and it only 
protected their rights on or to the farm in limited respects.  As a 
doctrinal matter, the case was narrowly engaged with the question of 
increasing the standard of living of workers in a uniquely private and 
confined context, namely in a camp on a private owner’s property.233  
This limitation may well be one reason why the case is cited so 
infrequently outside of New Jersey, which seems to be one of the few 
jurisdictions in which migrant workers consistently were housed on 
the farms where they worked.234  The case did not address the needs 
and rights of workers who left the property except to the extent that 
it relied on lawyers and other service providers to protect those rights 
through greater contact at the migrant workers’ camps.235  This 
                                                          
 231. Supra note 163. 
 232. Shack, 277 A.2d at 374 (holding that the defendants did not trespass). 
 233. The holding in the case signals this reality.  Id. (justifying aid workers’ ability 
to enter on private land to provide services to migrant workers). 
 234. S. REP. NO. 91-83, at 35 (1969) (stating eighty-six percent of migrant workers 
do not live on farms). 
 235. Shack, 277 A.2d at 374–75 (detailing only what the employers must do when 
visitors attempt to aid workers on their property). 
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protection was an important one, but again, it assumed continuing 
good will, interest, attention, and understanding on the part of the 
service providers in addressing the workers’ most pressing needs. 
Moreover, even the protections the case established for the workers 
on farm camps were incomplete.  For example, the defendants’ briefs 
described numerous and egregious examples of summary evictions, 
where employers required workers and their families to leave their 
homes with no notice.236  Given its emphasis on the right of access by 
others, the court’s holding would do nothing to address such deeds 
by employers.  Indeed, it is possible to imagine that a court 
construing Shack’s holding narrowly (but not unreasonably so) could 
conclude that the case would not prevent an employer from 
requiring his workers to remain on his farm, so long as such 
requirements did not rise to the egregious level of false 
imprisonment or similarly tortious behavior.237 
In addition to the costs imposed by the particularities of the New 
Jersey Supreme Court’s holding, there is the broader question of 
what was lost as a result of the court’s endorsement of the values and 
interests expressed in the federal Economic Opportunity Act and the 
1967 amendments thereto.238  One way to pose this question might be 
to ask what was lost by affiliating important values such as dignity, 
equality, and freedom with the qualitatively different value of 
integration.  The former set of values could be achieved outside of an 
integrative framework, although there is certainly a powerful 
argument that integration is a potent means of protecting such 
values.  But the federal statute consistently presumed that integration 
was the vehicle for protecting those values.239 
The answer to this question requires us to contemplate in greater 
detail the lives of the migrant workers off the farms and indeed 
beyond their work lives.  Given the paucity of qualitative information 
about the workers, this is not easy to do.  But even the statistics can be 
telling.  Although the 1964 and 1967 legislation make nothing of it, 
the legislative history, especially for the 1964 Act, provides relatively 
detailed demographics of the migrant workers who worked in the 
United States during the decade preceding the case.  They were 
predominantly male, although the majority of them traveled with one 
                                                          
 236. FARM WORKER DIV., supra note 167, at 6. 
 237. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 35 (1977) (defining false 
imprisonment); DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 381 (2d ed. 2011) 
(discussing the elements of the tort of false imprisonment). 
 238. Shack, 277 A.2d at 372–73. 
 239. See supra Part III.A.1 (describing the legislative history of the Economic 
Opportunity Act). 
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or more family members.240  A quarter of them were boys, age 
fourteen to seventeen.241  Among those of Mexican origin, “many” 
were “permanent immigrants” but “retain[ed] their residence in 
Mexico.”242  And “some” returned to “permanent homes in 
Mexico.”243  One important message to take from these statistics is 
that a significant number of workers maintained very strong ties to 
other countries, and that these ties were often physical, involving 
both ownership of property and connections with family members in 
those countries. 
It would be reasonable to assume that this subset of workers would 
have interests both in sending money safely home to other countries 
and in regularly visiting those countries.244  As a corollary, it would be 
reasonable to assume that these workers would treat the protection of 
their wages as paramount and perhaps even more important than 
their own living conditions on the farms.245  For residents of the 
United States, these kinds of protections have long existed in a suite 
of federal and state laws, including consumer protections for 
transmitting money by physical mail or electronic means and banking 
laws for protecting financial transactions,246 and of course labor and 
employment laws protecting access to wages earned.247  But these 
protections by and large did not exist for the migrant workers 
because they were typically trying to engage in transactions beyond 
the borders of the United States.248 
Rather than addressing these types of financial transactions, 
however, the federal statute, with its integrationist perspective, 
contributed tremendous resources to supporting homeownership 
among migrant workers.  The statute developed new sources and 
kinds of financing opportunities uniquely targeted to the workers, 
allocating a total of two million dollars for such long-term housing 
opportunities.249  It did so without any apparent attention to how 
many migrant workers could achieve sufficient wage levels and access 
                                                          
 240. S. REP. NO. 91-83, at 5, 8 (1969).   
 241. Id. at 4. 
 242. Id. at 11. 
 243. Id. 
 244. See generally Ezra Rosser, Immigrant Remittances, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1, 1 (2008) 
(proposing that remittance transactions “should be understood as an anti-poverty tool”). 
 245. See id. at 56–61 (discussing the motivations, centering on love, for sending 
remittances home). 
 246. See generally U.C.C. arts. 3–4 (2013) (creating uniform systems for negotiable 
instruments and bank deposits and collections). 
 247. See supra Part III.A.3.b (briefly discussing relevant federal laws). 
 248. See Rosser, supra note 244, at 28–37 (noting, for example, that in 2004 over 
thirty billion dollars in remittances were sent from the United States to Latin America). 
 249. S. REP. NO. 90-563, at 63 (1967). 
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to communities to be able to participate in the housing market even 
with the availability of financing.250  Equally importantly, it did so 
without paying attention to how many workers would want such 
opportunities and whether those numbers were commensurate with 
the resources allocated for such purposes.  The same could be said of 
English-integrative education for the children of the workers, though 
on this point it is important to acknowledge that a stay of any length 
in the United States may well have justified teaching the children 
English as a second language.251 
Meanwhile, these statutes, and federal law more generally, ignored 
the possibility that a greater number of migrant workers may well 
have prioritized legal protections for sending remittances to other 
countries over homeownership opportunities in the United States.  It 
was not until exactly forty years after the New Jersey Supreme Court 
decided State v. Shack that federal law provided limited protections 
for such transactions.  These protections, which required disclosure 
of all terms in both English and the language of the remittance 
sender and an error resolution procedure, can be found in the Dodd-
Frank Act.252 
But does that matter?  If the federal statute supported by cases such 
as State v. Shack significantly improved housing and work conditions 
for migrant workers on the farms, does it matter that such 
achievements were made at the expense of costs such as these?  The 
answer surely must be “yes” if meaningful resources were allocated 
for purposes of limited value to the workers.  It is clear that the 
emergency response embodied in the 1964 Act was likely helpful to a 
broad range of workers.  In this respect, the original statute had 
important value.  But it is also quite possible that the 1967 
Amendments went too far in the wrong direction, redirecting 
resources for emergency response instead to a subset of workers who 
sought—and had a good shot at achieving—longer-term integration.  
As importantly, the 1967 Amendments set the tone for federal law to 
establish a framework of support for migrant workers and much more 
broadly for immigrants to the U.S. that was and is blatantly focused 
on integration into middle class life.  This is a cause that many 
immigrants clearly endorse and share but also one that left out a 
subset of migrant workers and that continues to leave out a subset of 
                                                          
 250. Id. at 62.  
 251. S. REP. NO. 88-1218, at 30 (1964). 
 252. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, § 1073, 124 Stat. 1376, 2060, 2063 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 
15 U.S.C.). 
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immigrants.  In this respect, the 1967 Amendments particularly 
contributed to a significant gap in federal law that still exists today. 
As for the case as distinguished from the federal statutes, the New 
Jersey Supreme Court’s use of the federal statutes as a means of 
bolstering its analysis of Tedesco’s rights makes plain that the case 
was about property law.  It was not a case responding to the full range 
of actual needs and interests of the workers.  And this focus on 
property law relates to a more abstract cost that this Article proposes 
merely to name rather than explicate.  The consolidating effect of 
the court’s analysis, which focuses attention on owner versus non-
owner, extends beyond just the law of ownership.  While statutes such 
as the Economic Opportunity Act may have had far greater force in 
immigration reform than individual cases such as State v. Shack, it was 
no doubt affirming that the portrait the case painted was so similar to 
that painted by the federal statutes.  The case and the statutes 
supported each other in assuming a cohesive and comprehensive 
understanding of the workers.  The query, of course, is whether that 
understanding was, in important respects, false. 
IV. PRAGMATIC POSTCOLONIALISM IN RATIONAL LAWMAKING 
This Part is the prescriptive complement to the postcolonialist 
critique in Part III.  My purpose here is to further develop and then 
apply the pragmatic postcolonialist framework.  For this purpose, I 
turn in Section A to another important property law case.  Though it 
is not as iconic as State v. Shack, Hilder v. St. Peter presents a very 
different approach to representing the voice of the individual seeking 
relief.  In so doing, the case provides a basis for developing my 
proposed theoretical framework into an instrument that is 
convenient to use in actual decision-making.  In Section B, I evaluate 
the three devices that I argue are central to applying a pragmatic 
postcolonialist approach in property law.  Finally, in Section C, I 
apply these three devices to State v. Shack. 
A. Hilder v. St. Peter as an Example of Pragmatic Postcolonialism 
Perhaps the best vehicle for exploring whether it is possible for 
property law to create more space for subaltern voices is to look for a 
case that evinces more of a connection to one or more voices that 
may have been subaltern.  This section embodies such an effort by 
subjecting the case of Hilder v. St. Peter to the same analytical test 
imposed on State v. Shack in Part III of this Article.  Hilder was an 
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important contribution in the group of cases, beginning with Javins v. 
First National Realty Corp.,253 that established the implied warranty of 
habitability as a powerful protection for residential tenants.  It is a 
case brought by a woman against her landlords for their failure to 
provide her and her family with a habitable apartment.254 
It is not clear whether the plaintiff, Ella Hilder, was in fact 
“subaltern,” even as defined using the broader and more modern 
definitions of that term.255  We know a great deal more about Hilder 
than we do about the migrant workers with whom Shack and Tejeras 
tried to meet.  But we still do not know most of the central facts that 
would allow us to divine her membership in such a class.  This is both 
a strength and a weakness of my theoretical model.  It is a strength 
because my use of Hilder ought to demonstrate the accessibility of 
subaltern perspectives by means of the legal devices I discuss.  Even a 
case that failed to answer the basic question of subaltern status can 
point us in the direction of protecting subaltern voices.  But Hilder is 
also a weakness in my analysis because it does not provide a wholly 
successful demonstration of pragmatic postcolonialism.  We cannot 
know, for example, whether the remedies that the Hilder court 
suggested actually protected subalternity.  Such a demonstration 
must be left to other analyses. 
1. Differing representations 
a. The plaintiff’s testimony 
The difference between Shack and Hilder in their preservation of 
“voice” becomes immediately apparent when one begins to consider 
the very different representation of the plaintiff by the Vermont 
Supreme Court in Hilder.  Most palpably, one of the parties in the 
case, the plaintiff Ella Hilder, was also one of the ultimate targets of 
the Supreme Court of Vermont’s protection.256  In contrast to Shack, 
therefore, it was much more natural for one of the relevant “texts” in 
this case to be the plaintiff’s own testimony.  This text, indeed, was 
where the court’s opinion began. 
After introducing the basis for appeal by the defendants-landlords, 
the court immediately provided an “uncontested” description of the 
                                                          
 253. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.). 
 254. Hilder v. St. Peter, 478 A.2d 202, 205–06 (Vt. 1984).  The court quite clearly 
was also targeting Hilder’s children, as well as other tenants in the State of Vermont.  
Id. at 208 (explicitly adopting the implied warranty of habitability in Vermont). 
 255. See supra Part II.A (analyzing the problem of representing subaltern voices). 
 256. Hilder, 478 A.2d at 206 (using the implied warranty of habitability as a basis 
for protecting the plaintiff). 
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facts that drew extensively from the plaintiff’s testimony.257  As the 
court described, the plaintiff, her three children, and a newborn 
grandson lived in two different apartments in a building owned by 
the defendants (who were a married couple) for a period of twenty-
five months.258  The court described: 
Upon moving into the apartment, plaintiff discovered a broken 
kitchen window.  Defendant promised to repair it, but after waiting 
a week and fearing that her two year old child might cut herself on 
the shards of glass, plaintiff repaired the window at her own 
expense.  Although defendant promised to provide a front door 
key, he never did.  For a period of time, whenever plaintiff left the 
apartment, a member of her family would remain behind for 
security reasons.  Eventually, plaintiff purchased and installed a 
padlock, again at her own expense.  After moving in, plaintiff 
discovered that the bathroom toilet was clogged with paper and 
feces and would flush only by dumping pails of water into it.  
Although plaintiff repeatedly complained about the toilet, and 
defendant promised to have it repaired, the toilet remained 
clogged and mechanically inoperable throughout the period of 
plaintiff’s tenancy.  In addition, the bathroom light and wall outlet 
were inoperable.  Again, the defendant agreed to repair the 
fixtures, but never did.  In order to have light in the bathroom, 
plaintiff attached a fixture to the wall and connected it to an 
extension cord that was plugged into an adjoining room.  Plaintiff 
also discovered that water leaked from the water pipes of the 
upstairs apartment down the ceilings and walls of both her kitchen 
and back bedroom.  Again, defendant promised to fix the leakage, 
but never did.  As a result of this leakage, a large section of plaster 
fell from the back bedroom ceiling onto her bed and her 
grandson’s crib.  Other sections of plaster remained dangling from 
the ceiling.  This condition was brought to the attention of the 
defendant, but he never corrected it.  Fearing that the remaining 
plaster might fall when the room was occupied, plaintiff moved her 
and her grandson’s bedroom furniture into the living room and 
ceased using the back bedroom.  During the summer months an 
odor of raw sewage permeated plaintiff’s apartment.  The odor was 
so strong that the plaintiff was ashamed to have company in her 
apartment.  Responding to plaintiff’s complaints, Rutland City 
workers unearthed a broken sewage pipe in the basement of 
defendants’ building.  Raw sewage littered the floor of the 
basement, but defendant failed to clean it up.  Plaintiff also 
                                                          
 257. Id. at 205–06.  See also Transcript of Record at 6–22, Hilder, 478 A.2d 202 
(No. 82-440). 
 258. Hilder, 478 A.2d at 205.  
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discovered that the electric service for her furnace was attached to 
her breaker box, although defendant had agreed, at the 
commencement of plaintiff’s tenancy, to furnish heat.259 
Several features about the plaintiff’s testimony as “text” are 
relevant, especially when contrasted with the texts used to represent 
the migrant workers in State v. Shack.  First, the portrait that was 
presented of the plaintiff and her family was quite detailed.  There 
was very little question who the plaintiff was, what had happened, and 
why she was pursuing legal relief.  The kinds of basic questions one 
might ask about the migrant workers in Shack—How long had they 
lived on the property?  Did they have children?  How did their legal 
problems arise?—were easily answered by the statement of the facts in 
Hilder.  Second, this description of the plaintiff was not translated 
into a more abstract portrait of people “like her.”  Obviously, the fact 
that the picture of the plaintiff was taken largely from the plaintiff’s 
own testimony rendered superfluous the question of whether that 
picture actually “represented” the lived experience of the plaintiff 
and her children.  Contrast this with the picture of migrant workers 
presented by Dr. Coles in the legislative history for the 1967 
Amendments to the federal Economic Opportunity Act260 or even 
with the claims made by the defendants about the migrant workers in 
State v. Shack.261  The lens of interpretation was not required in Hilder.  
There was no need for such an abstraction. 
Third, it was very clear from the plaintiff’s testimony that she 
herself had articulated the legal and political representation, vertreten, 
that she desired.  It was plain that the plaintiff desired a more decent 
form of housing than the defendants had afforded her over the prior 
two years.262 
Fourth, therefore, the portrait, darstellen, that was presented was 
narrowly tailored to the legal question before the court.  While the 
court did not have occasion to examine the broader set of reasons 
that resulted in the plaintiff having no option but to live in 
defendants’ apartments, the court did work hard to connect the 
plaintiff’s lived experience to her legal experience.  In part, that 
effort was accomplished by choice of legal question.  In part, as I will 
                                                          
 259. Id. at 206. 
 260. See supra note 168 and accompanying text (describing Dr. Coles’s 
psychological portrait of migrant workers as distinct from American citizens in a 
variety of ways). 
 261. See generally Brief of the Defendants-Appellants, supra note 146, at 29 (citing 
the difficulty of working with migrant workers due to their “cultural alienation”). 
 262. Hilder, 478 A.2d at 206 (listing examples of ways the plaintiff attempted to 
rectify her deplorable living conditions when the defendant repeatedly failed to 
correct problems). 
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discuss below, it was accomplished by the choice of remedies that the 
court preserved for the plaintiff. 
Fifth, and again in contrast to the portrait presented of migrant 
workers by the 1967 Amendments to the Economic Opportunity Act, 
the portrait that emerged of the plaintiff was as someone who was 
neither incompetent nor in need of being “fixed.”  Rather, it was of 
someone who required the aid of a court to prevent the defendants 
from acting on their avarice. 
b.  Vermont landlord-tenant law 
As in State v. Shack, a second “text” that the court had before it in 
Hilder was state landlord-tenant law—this time, the law of the State of 
Vermont.  Also as in Shack, the use of this text raised the question of 
whether the representation of tenants within this area of law captured 
the voice(s) of the particular parties who claimed that status.263 
Just as in New Jersey, Vermont law in 1984 was bending in the 
direction of recognizing leases as a form of contract, thereby 
importing all of the norms of contract law into this form of property 
conveyance.  But rather than rejecting these norms as the Supreme 
Court of Jersey did in Shack, the Hilder court embraced and ultimately 
used them as a vehicle for preserving the plaintiff’s voice in that case.264 
In Vermont, the legal recognition of leases as contracts followed 
the path laid by the iconic case of Javins v. First National Realty Corp. 
and its progeny.  Such a trajectory began with the important 
recognition that it no longer reflected reality to enforce the principle 
of caveat lessee where the tenant was typically not a farmer “capable of 
making whatever repairs were necessary to his primitive dwelling.”265  
Rather it was the landlord who was “more familiar with the dwelling 
unit and mechanical equipment attached to that unit, and [was] 
more financially able to ‘discover and cure’ any faults and break-
downs.”266  The designation of leases as a form of contract therefore 
justified eliminating the requirement that a tenant’s choices when 
faced with inferior living conditions were to abandon the premises 
and stop paying rent or to remain and continue to pay rent.267 
                                                          
 263. Id. at 208, 211 (noting that the legislature has officially recognized the need 
for adequate housing to protect public health and safety). 
 264. Id. at 208–09, 211 (holding that a lease of a residential dwelling “creates a 
contractual relationship between the landlord and tenant” and that contract 
remedies are available for breach of these agreements).  
 265. Id. at 207.  
 266. Id.  
 267. Id. 
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Instead, under Vermont law, parties to leases had the right to avail 
themselves of the covenants, implied terms, and prevailing norms 
undergirding contract law, as well as contract remedies.268  For 
consumer products and services, such implied terms and covenants 
included the important warranties of quality (such as fitness and 
merchantability), which the Javins court identified in the lease 
context to amount to an implied warranty of habitability.269  As for 
remedies, the court claimed to follow Vermont law in holding that, 
because “the lease of a residential dwelling creates a contractual 
relationship between the landlord and tenant, the standard contract 
remedies of rescission, reformation and damages are available to the 
tenant when suing for breach of the implied warranty of habitability.”270 
At the same time, in recognizing the contractual nature of 
residential leases, Vermont law was quite specific in its understanding 
of the type of contract at issue in this context.  These were consumer 
contracts, practically in the nature of contracts of adhesion.  The 
Hilder court followed Javins and other warranty of habitability cases in 
recognizing that tenants in residential leases were “virtually powerless 
to compel the performance of essential services.”271  Residential leases 
under the landlord-tenant law of Vermont thus fell within a special 
category of contract law in which one party received additional 
statutory and common law protections as a result of her inferior 
bargaining status.272  In Vermont, this recognition came in the form 
of a statutory pronouncement: 
[S]ubstandard and decadent areas exist in certain portions of the 
state of Vermont and . . . there is not . . . an adequate supply of 
decent, safe and sanitary housing for persons of low income 
and/or elderly persons of low income, available for rents which 
such persons can afford to pay . . . this situation tends to cause an 
increase and spread of communicable and chronic disease . . . 
[and] constitutes a menace to the health, safety, welfare and 
comfort of the inhabitants of the state and is detrimental to 
property values in the localities in which it exists[.]273 
                                                          
 268. Supra note 264. 
 269. Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1075–78, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 
1970) (“Contract principles established in other areas of the law provide a more 
rational framework for the apportionment of landlord-tenant responsibilities; they 
strongly suggest that a warranty of habitability be implied into all contracts for urban 
dwellings.” (footnote omitted)). 
 270. Hilder, 478 A.2d at 209. 
 271. Id. at 207 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Javins, 428 F.2d at 1079 
(describing a lease as a contract). 
 272. Javins, 428 F.2d at 1079–80; Hilder, 478 A.2d at 209. 
 273. Hilder, 478 A.2d at 208 (first, second, third, fourth, and fifth alterations in 
original) (citation omitted). 
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The Hilder court identified this special species of contract with 
particular remedies that were not necessarily available in other 
contractual settings.  One clear example that existed in Vermont law 
was the important remedy of rent abatement.274  By connecting this 
remedy to a breach of warranty claim, the court firmly eliminated the 
property law requirement that a tenant must abandon an apartment 
to avoid paying rent.275 
Through what may have been a happy accident, the portrait of 
tenants that emerges from the court’s presentation of Vermont 
landlord-tenant law is noteworthy from a postcolonialist perspective.  
Even though the law effectively defined a class of tenants in need of 
legal protections, that definition was relatively narrow in its scope and 
imagery.276  The purpose of the representation was merely to afford 
enough protections to tenants to allow them access to safe, decent, 
and sanitary housing, although that may well have meant different 
things in different contexts.  There was no obvious broader agenda, 
such as economic or political integration or even poverty alleviation.  
This allowed for a class definition narrowly tailored to the political 
purpose.  At the same time, the vision of tenants under Vermont law 
was also pluralist.  At a basic level, while it was clear that the class of 
tenants at issue consisted of city dwellers, not farmers,277 the court 
acknowledged that some were elderly, some were of low income, 
some had relatively more bargaining power and sophistication, and 
some had less.278  This recognition matched the law:  while 
confirming that a lease was a form of contract, the court also found it 
to be a contract regularly used by parties with unequal bargaining 
power.279  Thus, what we see in Vermont law is a baseline definition of 
a basic class deserving of protection by means of consumer 
warranties.  But beyond that baseline, there is a recognition that 
tenants within the class are different.  There is a basic pluralism of 
needs discernable in the Vermont jurisprudence. 
2. The Supreme Court of Vermont’s opinion 
In working with these two texts—these two different portraits of 
tenants in Vermont—the Hilder court made some markedly different 
choices from those made by the Shack court.  One explanation for the 
                                                          
 274. Id. at 209–10. 
 275. Id. at 210 n.3. 
 276. See id. at 208 (tying the class definition very specifically to the questions of 
harm and remedy). 
 277. Id. at 207. 
 278. Id. at 208. 
 279. Id. at 207.   
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difference in adjudicatory choices may be that the Hilder court was 
not obliged to deploy nearly so much rhetorical force as the Shack 
court.  In Hilder, the court was able to follow the lead of famous cases 
in nearby jurisdictions to complete a progression already begun by 
the Vermont legislature and courts.280  As importantly, the 
progression did not involve the marshaling of rights powerful enough 
to overwhelm the countervailing right of property ownership.  In the 
landlord-tenant context, it was settled long before Hilder that the 
landlord had voluntarily relinquished her right of possession and use 
to the tenant in return for rent.  In Shack, by contrast, all of the skills 
of Llewellyn’s “skilful judge” were required to overcome the owner’s 
right to exclude for the purpose of giving a broadly defined class 
access to the norms of middle class American life.281 
The markers of this difference are evident throughout Hilder.  The 
beginning point for the court’s discussion was with the plaintiff’s own 
testimony.282  Thus, in effect, it was the plaintiff’s voice that defined 
the class (tenants) of which she was a member for purposes of legal 
representation.  Both the specificity of the legal representation 
required and the obvious match between the individual plaintiff and 
the class obviated the need for the court to generalize the details of 
the plaintiff’s circumstances or to consolidate her experience with 
those of other tenants.  The plaintiff clearly qualified as a member of the 
class entitled to protection from breaches of the warranty of habitability. 
But what makes Hilder an extraordinary case is the court’s reaction 
to this easy task of class definition.  The court could have simply 
concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to the protections clearly 
evident in Vermont law.  Doing so would have required the court 
simply to match the facts to the current state of the law on breaches 
of the warranty, and that in turn would have meant looking for 
violations of the housing code.  As the court stated: 
In determining whether there has been a breach of the implied 
warranty of habitability, the courts may first look to any relevant 
local or municipal housing code; they may also make reference to 
the minimum housing code standards . . . .  A substantial violation 
of an applicable housing code shall constitute prima facie evidence 
that there has been a breach of the warranty of habitability.283 
                                                          
 280. See id. at 207–11 (listing and describing cases). 
 281. Llewellyn, supra note 127, at 70–76 (describing a skillful judge as one who 
uses logic and wisdom to overcome the barriers of precedent). 
 282. Hilder, 478 A.2d at 205–06. 
 283. Id. at 208. 
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Any such violations would then be remedied by rent abatement and 
standard damages available for breach of contract.284 
But the court did not stop there.  Instead, the court deployed the 
two texts, not to filter out the pluralism within the portrait of tenants 
presented by Vermont law, but rather to accentuate and protect those 
individualisms.  In doing so, the court both extended the warranty of 
habitability claim at the same time that it adopted it in Vermont and 
expanded the range of remedies available for such a breach.285  
Regarding the claim itself, the court held that it was “merely . . . a 
starting point” to look at the housing codes to determine whether a 
breach of the warranty had occurred.286  The court also inquired into 
“whether the claimed defect has an impact on the safety or health of 
the tenant.”287  In so doing, the court combined an objective standard 
relating to “safety” and “health” with a highly individualized look at 
the particular tenant bringing the claim.  In Hilder, for example, 
that likely meant that the plaster falling from the ceiling in one of 
the bedrooms was not merely an inconvenience.288  Rather, it was a 
safety and health issue for the newborn child into whose crib the 
plaster was falling.289 
The court also required this type of individualized inquiry in 
determining remedies for the breach.  For example, in addition to 
affirming the important remedy of rent abatement, the court cited a 
Vermont employment case in concluding that damages ought to be 
available to the plaintiff for the “discomfort and annoyance” she and 
her family experienced at the hands of the defendants.290  Similarly, 
the court concluded that, although punitive damages are not the 
norm in contract cases, a landlord’s “willful and wanton or 
fraudulent” behavior could justify such damages in cases adjudicating 
breaches of lease agreements.291 
In these details, the “skilful judg[ing]” in Hilder was of an entirely 
different sort than in Shack.292  In Shack, the court filtered out 
                                                          
 284. Id. at 209. 
 285. See id. at 208–09 (asserting that a breach of the warranty of habitability can be 
remedied through standard contractual remedies, and that a court, when 
determining if a breach has occurred, should look to relevant municipal housing 
codes, statutory standards, and the claimed defect’s impact on the health and safety 
of the tenant). 
 286. Id. at 209. 
 287. Id. 
 288. See id. at 206 (noting the plaster fell into the plaintiff’s grandchild’s crib).  Of 
course, this would need to be determined by a trial court on remand.  Id. at 211. 
 289. Id. at 206. 
 290. Id. at 209. 
 291. Id. at 210. 
 292. Llewellyn, supra note 127, at 73. 
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differences in order to create a class that appeared as a paragon of 
cohesion and compelling need.  In Hilder, the court identified 
differences that required different legal responses at different times.  
The need for housing required a property response.293  The basic 
reality of bargaining required contract protections.294  The inequality 
of bargaining required consumer law protections in the form of an 
implied warranty.295  The public health and sanitation issues required 
reference to housing and health codes.296  The court inquired into 
the plaintiff’s particular health and safety to protect a newborn, the 
plaintiff’s desire to be a host in her own home, and her 
individualized sense of dignity.297  It also raised the possibility of 
reparation by means of punitive damages.298  The court matched the 
pluralism in legal values to the pluralism in values of the individuals 
in the class of tenants. 
It should be clear, then, that there is room for skillful judging to 
pay more attention to voice while remaining very skillful.  At bottom, 
Hilder demonstrates that postcolonialism can have an instrumentalist 
edge.  While Spivak may not have advocated, approved of, or even 
thought of the instrumentalist manifestations of her critique, the 
pieces of postcolonialist analysis that I adopt here are intended for 
use by a court required to make a rational decision.299 
B. Three Devices for Protecting Subaltern Voices in Property Law 
Hilder thus provides a rich basis for developing my pragmatic 
postcolonialist framework into a workable instrument for legal 
decision-making.  Built on a foundation of pluralism, the case 
provides three specific devices that can be enormously useful in 
unearthing and protecting subaltern voices.  This Section explicates 
both the foundation and the features of each device. 
The foundation for incorporating the subaltern perspective into 
property law is to acknowledge the importance of pluralism.  As 
                                                          
 293. Hilder, 478 A.2d at 208 (emphasizing the Vermont legislature’s interest in 
strengthening property values through local housing authorities). 
 294. See Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1079–80 (D.C. Cir. 1970) 
(noting that tenants and landlords generally have unequal bargaining power and 
that contractual protections help ensure tenants’ legitimate expectations of quality). 
 295. Id. at 1079.  
 296. Hilder, 478 A.2d at 208. 
 297. See id. at 205–06 (detailing the plaintiff’s various health and safety concerns 
and the landlord’s failure to respond to each one).  
 298. See id. at 210 (holding punitive damages are appropriate when a landlord fails 
to repair a facility that is “essential to the health and safety of his or her tenant” after 
he receives notice of a defect). 
 299. See Alexander, Pluralism and Property, supra note 16, at 1045–51 (discussing the 
imperative for judges to make rational choices between values). 
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recent scholarship has compellingly demonstrated, a monist 
perspective in property law relentlessly reduces individual values into 
a more cohesive and unitary understanding of needs, welfare, and 
desires about and through property.300  Such a reductive influence 
emphasizes the economic importance of ownership over other values, 
and as we have seen in Shack, dictates a framework in which 
something really extraordinary is required to overcome rights of 
ownership.301  When courts recognize multiple values that may at 
times conflict, we can expect them to use legal mechanisms to protect 
those values as coequal with the economic rights of owners.  This not 
only has the benefit of more widely distributed legal protection, but 
as we have seen in Hilder, it creates and protects opportunities for 
subaltern voices to be heard. 
But adopting a more instrumentalist version of postcolonialism in 
property law requires more.  In particular, what is required are 
mechanisms that expose pluralist, even fragmented, perspectives in 
the process of constructing a class for the purpose of legal 
representation.  Stated differently, the pragmatic postcolonialist 
challenge is to preserve the fragmentation in darstellen even as 
instrumentalist cohesion is achieved at some beneficial level for the 
purpose of vertreten.  Hilder is particularly instructive here because the 
Hilder court made such accomplished use of three reliable legal 
devices that serve that purpose. 
The first device is the case attorney’s love of stories.  As Llewellyn 
so eloquently described, those of us steeped in the common law “have 
learned that the concrete instance, the heaping up of concrete 
instances, the present, vital memory of a multitude of concrete 
instances, is necessary in order to make any general proposition, be it 
rule of law or any other, mean anything at all.”302  The particular facts 
of a case are what give it meaning.  But as Hilder shows, from a 
postcolonialist perspective, sharing facts can be a powerful way to 
create space for the unique voice of subaltern individuals.  The 
statement of facts, including facts that appear irrelevant to the legal 
conclusion, can serve to separate the aesthetic representation of the 
parties from the legal and political representation.  But Hilder also 
shows us that the device of fact stating in common law jurisprudence 
                                                          
 300. Id. at 1045; Hanoch Dagan, Pluralism and Perfectionism in Private Law 2–3, 
10, 12–13 (June 20, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1868198 (promoting instead a pluralistic approach to 
“account for the vast heterogeneity of . . . private law doctrines”). 
 301. See State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 370–71 (N.J. 1971) (detailing Tedesco’s 
refusal to allow the defendants on to the property to aid the workers). 
 302. Llewellyn, supra note 127, at 12. 
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is not merely aesthetic or rhetorical.  Unlike the technique of 
creating space for personal narratives in the process of client 
interviewing, fact stating of the kind that occurred in Hilder did more 
than “empower” the client.303  In Hilder, the plaintiff’s story also had 
the power to serve as a basis for an individualized claim of breach of 
warranty—grounded in the unique health and safety concerns of 
the plaintiff and her family—as well as a basis for uniquely tailored 
remedies.304  In these respects, the use of the plaintiff’s testimony 
as text made the most beneficial advantage of the storytelling 
process in litigation. 
The second device that Hilder teaches is the importance of tying 
the legal claims to the individualized portrait of the parties pursuing 
those claims.  In Hilder, the court accomplished this task by requiring 
future courts investigating breach of warranty claims to consider the 
individualized health and safety of the tenant in the case.305  Spivak 
may well not have approved of such a move because of the risk that it 
would further intertwine the aesthetic with the political forms of 
representation.306  But from a pragmatic postcolonialist perspective, 
the infusion of the plaintiff’s voice into the legal claim forced 
recognition of the fragmented nature of that claim.  For some 
tenants, falling plaster would be un-concerning; for this one, it was an 
important safety concern.307  Some tenants would be able to find 
better, more expensive housing; this one presumably could not.  
Even though the plaintiff may not have been at risk of catching 
communicable diseases from her living situation, elderly tenants 
likely would encounter such risks.308 
The counterpart to recognizing the fragmented nature of tenants’ 
claims is recognizing that the landlord’s rights are also fragmented in 
nature because the landlord transfers rights of possession and use to 
the tenant.  But the Hilder court also de facto determined that 
                                                          
 303. For leading discussions of the value of client narratives, see Anthony V. Alfieri, 
Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice:  Learning Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 YALE L.J. 
2107, 2109–11 (1991) (starting an essay with a client’s personal narrative of living 
without gas and electricity while on public assistance); López, supra note 104, at 618, 
623–25 (discussing undocumented Mexican workers); Lucie E. White, Subordination, 
Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes:  Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L. 
REV. 1, 21–28 (1990) (providing the story of a client to “trace how the complex realities 
of social inequality undermine the law’s formal promise of procedural justice”).  
 304. See Hilder v. St. Peter, 478 A.2d 202, 208–09 (Vt. 1984). 
 305. Id. 
 306. Spivak, Can the Subaltern Speak?, supra note 12, at 275–79 (expounding on the 
importance of fragmented voice). 
 307. See Hilder, 478 A.2d at 206 (explaining the plaster fell from the ceiling onto 
the plaintiff’s bed and her grandson’s crib). 
 308. Id. at 208 (noting the Vermont legislature’s concern for low income and 
elderly people). 
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sometimes a landlord breaches a warranty by failing to replace 
plaster, and sometimes not.309  More broadly, as against different 
tenants in different circumstances, the same landlord may be 
constrained by different contract limitations.  The pluralism in legal 
values, as between property law and contract law for instance,310 can 
serve as the basis for recognizing the pluralism in values and rights.  
Indeed, a court could extend the device of preserving individual (and 
fragmented) voice through the legal claims even beyond its use in 
Hilder by reading precedent with an eye toward identifying the 
fragmented nature of the rights protected by the legal decisions in 
those cases.  By reading cases for fragmentation rather than cohesion, 
courts can reinforce and extend Hilder’s methodology for protecting 
voice in the course of legal representation. 
The third, and perhaps most potent, device from Hilder is the 
deconsolidation of voice and identity by means of choice of remedy.  
In Hilder, this device allowed the court to recognize the unique 
impact of the defendants’ actions on the plaintiff at the point when 
the breach of warranty claim had already been proven.311  The 
individualized recognition of needs through remedies is by no means 
new.  All that the postcolonialist perspective adds is a special inquiry into 
whether particular remedies might better reflect the subaltern voice. 
Examples abound in property law of courts acknowledging the 
unique details of a dispute through remedies.  Very often, in doing so 
courts recognize the unique relationships among the different 
parties.312  For example, in Rase v. Castle Mountain Ranch, Inc.,313 after 
balancing the parties’ rights to real property surrounding a lake 
owned by the plaintiff but on which the defendants had built their 
homes with the encouragement of the plaintiff’s predecessor in 
ownership, the court included in its remedy a period of time in which 
defendants could disassemble their homes with dignity and find 
other places to live.314  Demonstrating the extraordinary potential of 
remedies, in Southern Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of 
                                                          
 309. See id. at 206, 208–09 (noting the claimed defect must “affect the health or 
safety of a tenant,” and implying, in this case, the plaster could affect the health and 
safety of the tenant if it fell from the ceiling when the tenant’s room was occupied). 
 310. Cf. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 
COLUM. L. REV. 773, 774–77 (2001) (discussing contract law as a set of default rules and 
property law as a set of mandatory rules that cannot be changed by mutual agreement). 
 311. Hilder, 478 A.2d at 209–10. 
 312. In so much of his work, Professor Singer has emphasized the importance of 
relationships in property lawmaking.  See, e.g., Singer, Reliance Interest, supra note 8, at 
690–91 (explaining the common law rule that “impose[s] a duty to act to help others 
when a special relationship exists between the parties”). 
 313. 631 P.2d 680 (Mont. 1981). 
 314. Id. at 686. 
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Mount Laurel,315 the court created a state-wide administrative structure 
designed to inquire extensively into whether municipalities in the 
State of New Jersey were providing meaningful housing opportunities 
for all their residents.316  This was a remarkable example of 
recognizing the structural inability of some residents to speak.  The 
court chose a remedy that addressed the structural problem with 
care and precision. 
More broadly, property law is teeming with examples of injunctions 
awarded in recognition of the uniqueness of land.317  Pragmatic 
postcolonialism would only slightly expand the inquiry in such cases 
to recognize the uniqueness of the parties and their relationships to 
the land and each other as well.  In other cases, however, where 
courts seeking cohesion might be tempted to view a property dispute 
involving written contracts through the lens of contract law to the 
exclusion of property law, pragmatic postcolonialism could have a 
distinctive impact.  In such cases, a focus on the voices of the parties 
could well dictate injunctive relief, thereby importing a property 
value into a contract context.  Doing so would result in greater 
pluralism of legal values as a reflection of the pluralistic values of the 
parties themselves. 
From the perspective of pragmatic postcolonialism, remedies are 
valuable devices partly because of timing.  They have the potential to 
undo—at an appropriate point in the litigation—that which courts 
(and counsel for the parties) may feel utterly compelled to do at an 
earlier stage in the case.  As I have discussed, it may often appear 
impossible to pursue a claim on behalf of a party without matching 
her facts to the facts of precedential cases.  Doing so is a 
consolidating process.  Ella Hilder may not have cared about the 
housing code violations.  She may have felt much more harmed by 
her inability to host dinner guests and by the plaster falling on her 
newborn.  But even in Vermont, the code violations were the starting 
point for determining whether the defendants had breached the 
warranty of habitability.318  The legal imperative of pursuing claims 
may require the formation of a class that must, to some extent, be 
                                                          
 315. 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975). 
 316. See id. at 731–33 (discussing the role of a state planning agency in determining 
a municipality’s fair share of the present and prospective regional need). 
 317. See Douglas Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule, 103 HARV. L. REV. 
687, 704–05 (1990) (listing a number of types of property cases involving “wrongs” 
and indicating that courts “almost never withhold injunctive relief in these cases on 
the ground that damages are an adequate remedy”).  
 318. Hilder v. St. Peter, 478 A.2d 202, 208–09 (Vt. 1984). 
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unified and represented by someone outside of that class.319  As we 
saw in Shack, this process of class formation also has the tendency to 
superimpose a more general set of “moral” claims to strengthen the 
legal claims, a process of abstraction that makes the portrait less 
representative of reality.320  But at the stage of determining remedies, 
the members of that class can be given the opportunity to reassert 
control by voicing those particular harms that most injured them.  
The portrait can be used at this stage to enunciate the injury, even if 
that injury conflicts with aspects of the legal claim.  At the remedial 
stage, conflicting interests and rights do not destroy the case.  The 
more general moral claims are no longer relevant.  By means of 
remedies, then, the individual features of the portrait can serve the 
instrumentalist purpose of giving the parties that which they sought 
through litigation. 
Finally, one of the really special advantages of using remedies as a 
means of protecting voice is that it provides a structural framework 
that fits relatively seamlessly within the current structure of dispute 
resolution.  It may be relatively more unusual in claim construction to 
individualize the inquiry to the extent the Hilder court did.  Such a 
level of individualized inquiry might be subject to critiques that any 
benefits would be outweighed by the administrative costs required to 
adjudicate such claims.321  But it is commonplace that individualized 
inquiry occurs at the level of allocating remedies.  Thus the current 
framework supports the protection of voice through the remedial inquiry. 
Together, these three devices from Hilder achieve a meaningful 
protection of subaltern voices while also preserving (indeed 
enhancing) the judge’s ability to make rational choices in the face of 
conflicting values.  There is sufficient space in the precedential 
process for instilling the localism that Sen seeks in his insistence 
against universal values.322  A rational legal decision-maker may often 
conclude that universal values have a place.  But both in the 
construction of claims, and much more often in the awarding of 
remedies, such universalism can be replaced with the unique voices 
of the parties in the case. 
                                                          
 319. Spivak, Can the Subaltern Speak?, supra note 12, at 276–78 (suggesting that 
such a representative “must appear simultaneously as their master, as an authority 
over them, as unrestricted government power”).  
 320. See supra Part III.A.1 (explaining that migrant workers as a class did not 
clearly evidence a desire to live as middle class Americans, but that desire was 
reflected in legislation aimed to remedy extreme circumstances of poverty). 
 321. For an example of such a critique, see Smith, Property and Property Rules supra 
note 111, at 1741 (arguing “liability rule is not warranted” if administrative costs 
outweigh the benefits). 
 322. Sen, supra note 89, at 244. 
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C. Reconsidering State v. Shack from a Pragmatic Postcolonialist 
Perspective 
Reconsidering Shack from the perspective of pragmatic 
postcolonialism, it is immediately striking that as a remedial matter, 
the most promising claim for the migrant workers may well have been 
the landlord-tenant argument.  The problem with both the 
Supremacy Clause and First Amendment claims was that they focused 
remedial attention on Shack and Tejeras (the service providers) 
rather than on the migrant workers.323  In the case of the Supremacy 
Clause claim, the remedy would have been to allow people like Shack 
and Tejeras access to the camp.  The result would have been the 
provision on-site of the types of services provided by those two 
defendants, but it would not have allowed much space for the 
migrant workers to articulate whether they needed those services 
more than other types of services.  Nor of course would such a 
remedy have created any room for articulating the need for services 
that could not be provided by workers who were performing work 
funded by either the Economic Opportunity Act or one of the other 
federal statutes that funded the defendants’ work.324  If a court was to 
conclude that Tedesco’s camp qualified as a “company town” or 
similarly public space, the migrant workers might have had a slightly 
larger opportunity to articulate their particular needs relating to free 
association and speech.325  But in the First Amendment context, the 
remedy is bluntly negative:  Tedesco might have been required to 
allow assembly and affiliation with guests of the workers, but not 
much more.326 
The two federal claims were also problematic foundations for 
applying the first and second devices from Hilder.  Both as a 
launching point for storytelling and as a basis for individualizing a 
claim, these two claims are troublesome because they impose such 
rigid requirements for creating a class and establishing rights.  As we 
have seen, the Economic Opportunity Act, which served as the basis 
for the Supremacy Clause claim, propagated an integrationist view of 
migrant workers that was so well developed that it left little room for 
                                                          
 323. See State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 371 (N.J. 1971). 
 324. Id. at 371–72. 
 325. See id. at 371 (discussing Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), where the 
U.S. Supreme Court held a Jehovah’s Witness who gave out materials on a sidewalk 
was not a trespasser because the person was in a company-owned town that was open 
to the public). 
 326. Id. 
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personalization.327  To qualify migrant workers for aid, it would be 
necessary to portray them as desperately needy, lacking basic civil and 
political rights, and singularly focused on achieving a long-term 
existence in middle class America.328  Thus, those who were seen as 
not caring about property would have a difficult time meeting the 
requirements for joining the class of those qualifying for aid under 
the statute.329  Similarly with the First Amendment claims, the inquiry 
would focus on whether the migrant workers were interested in 
affiliation, free speech, and association.  Facts that did not lend 
themselves to these claims and rights would be irrelevant to the story. 
Meanwhile, from a remedial perspective, the trouble with the 
trespass claim is that the explicit focus is on the owner’s right to 
exclude.  Definition of the workers’ rights is tangential to that issue, 
though it is certainly possible that such definition could produce 
tangible results akin to remedies for the migrant workers.  For 
example, without changing the legal positioning in the case much at 
all, the court could have remanded for the lower court to conduct a 
remedial inquiry into what exactly the migrant workers and the 
service providers needed by way of access to and use of Tedesco’s 
property.  Those particular needs and the injuries with which they 
were connected could have been the basis for creating exceptions 
within the law of trespass.  In this respect, the remedial inquiry also 
could have been linked to the second device from Hilder:  the court 
could have created exceptions to trespass that would require more 
specific inquiries into the non-owner’s uses of the owner’s property.  
But as we have seen, up against the formidable right of ownership, 
these exceptions would have to be grounded in well-articulated, 
powerful, and cohesive countervailing rights.330  There would not be 
much room for storytelling that did not lead to the central moral of 
the story. 
This leaves the landlord-tenant claim.  As Hilder suggests, a focus 
on whether Tedesco violated the rights of the migrant workers as his 
                                                          
 327. See id. (explaining that the purpose of the Economic Opportunity Act was to 
improve the migrant workers’ living conditions, to develop important skills for 
employment, and to provide funding for programs to meet the immediate needs of 
workers and their families). 
 328. See supra Part III.A.1 (noting the Economic Opportunity Act was intended to 
benefit those migrant workers who were living in extreme poverty but was not 
intended to benefit those who planned to stay in America for a short time or who 
sought work in America solely for the purpose of sending money back home). 
 329. S. REP. NO. 91-83, at 16 (1969) (noting it is “hard to dispute” complaints 
about migrants who do not want to take advantage of benefits of integrating in 
American society). 
 330. See supra Part II.B (discussing ownership as a powerful consolidating impulse 
in property law that requires unequivocal and forceful opposition to overcome). 
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tenants immediately directs the inquiry to how the workers lived 
while at the labor camp on Tedesco’s farm.  This creates space for 
stories.  As the briefs filed by the defendants in the case demonstrate, 
we can see the potential for examining the conditions experienced by 
both the workers and their families.331  Hilder also instructs us on the 
possibilities of individualizing the claims of the migrant workers as 
tenants.  Perhaps some wanted access for guests such as Shack and 
Tejeras, while others would have prioritized negotiations over rent 
and rent abatement so that they could maximize their resources for a 
return to their countries of origin.  The point here is that the 
landlord-tenant claims seemed to provide the most direct legal route 
into listening to the voices of the workers themselves.  These claims 
contain no complicated and excessive build-up around the creation 
of rights.  They require inquiries into the lived experiences of the 
workers.  They create a foundational class (of tenants) onto which 
additional interests can be layered. 
But the radically hypothetical nature of this exercise should be 
both a warning signal and should point us to the most basic lesson 
from reconsidering Shack.  While we may develop some instincts 
about what kinds of claims are better as a vehicle for protecting 
subalternity, Shack cannot take us very far in a postcolonialist inquiry.  
What is most striking about Shack from a postcolonialist perspective is 
that we simply do not have enough information to know what the 
workers in that case wanted, whether the right to associate, the 
protection of wages and remittances, more habitable living 
conditions, or something else.  In this respect, Shack adds a fourth 
device, more basic than the three outlined here:  the first question 
should be to ask what those whom the court seeks to protect want by 
way of legal intervention.  This is one legal moment in which there is 
no substitute for Sen’s insistence on “local” control.332  We can 
hypothesize from the statistics, but we cannot know in the way we 
knew of Ella Hilder’s legal desires.  In its failure to answer this 
question, for all its important contributions about ownership, Shack 
was a postcolonialist non-starter for the particular non-owners at the 
heart of the case.  It was a case about ownership, but not a case that 
protected the voices of the particular non-owners who so claimed the 
court’s attention and sympathy. 
                                                          
 331. See generally supra note 167 (citing an unpublished report that the defendants 
filed as an appendix to their brief on appeal to the Supreme Court of New Jersey in 
State v. Shack). 
 332. Sen, supra note 89. at 157–59. 
